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Dignity and Degradation: 




 The ideal of human dignity is making increasingly frequent appearances across 
national jurisdictions and in a wide range of juridical arenas.  Recent case law and 
scholarship suggest the possibility that regard for human dignity implies basic socio-
economic rights such as decent housing and running water,1 or that the infirm are entitled 
to health care,2 or that governments should not execute their most marginalized citizens 
as punishment for a crime.3 Dignity also has shown up in a handful of cases regarding 
sex, where the question has been about the extent to which sexual practices such as 
sodomy or prostitution should be entitled to constitutional protection.  A careful reading 
of the sex cases reveals some risks associated with uncritical reliance on the dignity ideal.  
This article reviews the concept of dignity historically, examines contemporary sex cases 
from a few different national jurisdictions for possible historical and transnational 
continuities, and urges that dignity poses unique legal hazards to reformist efforts to gain 
constitutional protection for a wide array of sexual practices. 
 
† Professor of Law, Northeastern University.  I received helpful feedback from Dan Danielsen, Wendy 
Parmet, Philomila Tsoukala, Dan Williams, Lucy Williams, and members of the Human Rights Interest 
Group at Northeastern University School of Law, for which I am grateful.  Thanks also to Jack Cushman 
and Kate Pascuzzi for valuable research assistance.  Finally, Janet Halley gave generously of her customary 
and utterly indispensable insight and comradeship, for which she has my unending thanks. 
1 See e.g., Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order, 16 S. 
AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 193, 202 (2000). 
2 See id. 
3 Se, e.g., Russel Miller, The Shared Transatlantic Jurisprudence of Dignity, 4 GERMAN L.J. 925 (2003), 
and Daniel Williams, ______________, ___ HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REV __ (2006). 
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Dignity, for a long time, has stood for at least two broad ideas.  The first idea is 
that all human beings have dignity innately.  This idea has a theological incarnation, 
according to which human beings have dignity because they were created in the image of 
God, as well as a secular incarnation, according to which human beings have dignity 
because they have rationality.  I will refer to dignity’s first meaning—whether its 
religious or secular origins are implicated—as “universalist” or “egalitarian.”  
Dignity’s second meaning diverges radically from its first.  Rather than being a 
universal trait, dignity in its second usage derives from social rank.  It distinguishes rather 
than equalizes us.  Dignity is what the aristocracy has on the unwashed masses.  I will 
refer to dignity’s non-universal, anti-egalitarian meaning as “aristocratic” or 
“hierarchical.”4
This article argues that while aristocratic dignity might appear outdated in modern 
legal systems with an egalitarian ethos, it is still very much alive, if sometimes difficult to 
discern.  While universalist and aristocratic dignity appear at first blush to stand in stark 
opposition to one another, the former analytically relies on the latter—that is, an assertion 
of egalitarian dignity is one side of a coin, the other side of which is necessarily 
degradation of something excluded and therefore the establishment of a hierarchy.  When 
universalist dignity is invoked, therefore, it is worth investigating the basis for the 
 
4 The taxonomy of dignity elaborated in this paper is not the only possible or useful one.  For example, 
Alan Gewirth sets forth two types of dignity which he calls empirical and inherent, the former being a trait 
that one might exhibit (“[s]he generally comports herself with dignity,”), while the latter is intrinsic to all 
human beings.  (Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in  THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 12 
(Michael J. Meyer & William A Parent eds., 1992).  Gewirth’s taxonomy is not wholly unrelated to the one 
used in this paper, but it raises a slightly different set of theoretical questions on which I will not focus, 
such as whether rights must be deserved, and whether it is theoretically possible to be deprived of one’s 
dignity.  See id. at 10-11.  Moreover, if dignity is conceptualized as empirical, and if rationality provides 
the basis for dignity, (i.e., it is human rationality that entitles human beings to dignity-based rights,) then 
the question arises whether young children or mentally disabled persons lack entitlement to rights. This 
paper will not get into this set of questions, but suffice it to say that dignity can be conceptualized in more 
than one way and that different quandaries result. 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
Dignity & Degradation 3 11/10/2006 
assertion of dignity, what—lacking that basis—is excluded, and consequently what 
hierarchy has been produced or maintained.   
In the context of constitutional protection for certain sexual practices on dignity 
grounds, constitutional courts have dignified some practices, thereby degrading others 
and producing a sexual hierarchy.  This is not inherently bad, but the specific hierarchy 
should be highlighted and evaluated for its desirability.   
A key basis that appears across a handful of national jurisdictions for dignifying 
constitutionally protected sexual practices is the nature of the relationship in which the 
sex occurs, producing a hierarchy between sex that occurs in the context of a normatively 
privileged relationship and sex that occurs outside of that context.  This paper highlights 
the under-acknowledged importance of relationship in constitutional law governing sex 
and proposes and skeptically evaluates reasons for this preoccupation.  It also examines 
dignity’s connection to rationality, and situates that connection historically, devoting 
particular attention to developments that occurred at the time of the Enlightenment and 
after World War II, and finds that the interplay among dignity, rationality and sex 
presents a formidable obstacle to achieving broad constitutional protection for sexual 
practices.  The paper concludes that attaching the dignity of sex to the relational context 
in which it occurs has injurious consequences for sex generally—not merely for the 
degraded varieties.  
 
II. Two Strands of Meaning 
 In one sense, the term dignity can be understood to contain a contradiction.  As 
Michael Warner explains: 
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Dignity has at least two radically different meanings in our culture.  One is 
ancient, closely related to honor, and fundamentally an ethic of rank.  It is 
historically a value of nobility.  It requires soap.  (Real estate doesn’t hurt, 
either.)  The other is modern and democratic. Dignity in the latter sense is 
not pomp and distinction; it is inherent in the human.  You can’t, in a way, 
not have it.  At worst, others can simply fail to recognize your dignity.5
Warner observes that the two meanings are “radically different,” which is undoubtedly 
correct.  On an axis of egalitarianism-to-hierarchy, however, we might even go so far as 
to observe their opposition.  It is difficult to imagine how such apparently conflicting 
meanings could coexist in a single word,6 but they have done so, as it turns out, for a very 
long time.   
A conference at Hebrew University celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights resulted in a helpful volume on the meaning and 
origins of dignity in human rights thought and practice.7 This book brings together legal, 
philosophical, psychological, historical and theological perspectives on the topic, mainly 
by enthusiasts.  In their forward, the editors mark the pertinence of their efforts by 
reviewing some of the important legal instruments, including various international 
declarations as well as Israeli, German and South African basic laws and constitutions, in 
which dignity is a central precept, and offer to launch a multi-disciplinary dialogue on 
dignity’s meaning.8 The first few essays in the collection begin with dignity’s roots.   
 
5 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 36 (1999). 
6 In some of the material that I have come across in my research, the single term dignity contains these 
meanings, but a few authors draw a distinction between dignity and dignity of man or human dignity, and a 
few siphon off dignity’s aristocratic meaning into the term honor.
7 See David Kertzmer & Eckart Klein, Forward to THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE vi (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
8 See id. at v-vi (citing___).   
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A. Ancient Sources 
According to Hubert Cancik,9 while there likely was a Greek predecessor,10 
Cicero provides our earliest recorded references to the “dignity of man.”11 In his use of 
the term dignitas, Cancik explains, Cicero usually meant “rank or worth.”12 Cancik 
translates Cicero’s definition as follows: “Dignity is someone’s virtuous authority which 
makes him worthy to be honored with regard and respect.”13 Reflecting on the Latin 
common usage, Cancik elaborates by noting that Cicero’s definition “brings social 
aspects, like rank and prestige, into the foreground.”14 
But, as the next section of Cancik’s essay shows, Cicero made another claim, also 
associated with the Latin term dignitas. “Human dignity, Cicero claims, resides ‘in 
human nature,’ and it is Nature herself who…gave reason and freedom of moral decision 
to all human beings.”15 Recalling the centrality of both nature and reason to Stoicism,16 
Cancik explains that Cicero and the Stoics understood “natural law, rule of reason, and 
natural rights, equal for all men, [to be] linked together.”17 
9 Hubert Cancik, ‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De 
Officiis I 105-107, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 19 (David 
Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
10 The likely predecessor on whom Cicero often relied was Panaetius of Rhodes. See id. at 22. 
11 See id. See also Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional 
Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903 (2000) crediting Cicero with the earliest use of the term dignity to 
refer to “[m]an’s special, inherent quality as a rational being”). 
12 See Cancik, supra note __ at 20. 
13 Id. at 23. 
14 Id.
15 Id. at 24. 
16 See id. 
17 Id. at 25. 
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Cancik’s reading is easily supported by the text of Cicero’s political work De 
Officiis.18 
[E]ach of us is endowed by nature with two characters: the 
first is common to all, in that we share that reason and 
dignity which is the mark of our superiority over the animal 
kingdom, and from which is derived all that is good and 
fitting as well as the capacity for discovering our duty; the 
second is particular to each individual… in characters there 
are…many… differences.19 
As Thomas Mitchell explains, dignitas in this second context “denoted the esteem and 
standing enjoyed by an individual because of the merit that was perceived to exist in 
him.”20 It mitigated Cicero’s egalitarianism by recognizing gradations in individual 
capacity.21 This should not, however, be read as purely meritocratic.  Mitchell clarifies 
Cicero’s position by pointing to the importance of birth: “[D]ignitas did not seem to 
[Cicero] to be compatible with the world of the poor and the humbly employed…. [It] 
belonged for him in the loftier ambience of those whose wealth liberated them from the 
necessity of… hiring their services.”22 As Mitchell concludes, Cicero’s concept of 
dignitas contained both merit and heredity, “derived from genus as well as from personal 
worth.”23 
18 CICERO, ON MORAL OBLIGATION: A NEW TRANSLATION OF CICERO’S DE OFFICIIS (John Higginbotham 
trans., 1967). 
19 Id. at 76. 
20 THOMAS N. MITHCELL, CICERO: THE SENIOR STATESMEN 47 (1991). 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 48-49. 
23 Id. at 50. 
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It is this dual-stranded etymological history that evidently accounts for the 
contradiction that appears right out of the gate in Cancik’s essay in the Kretzmer-Klein 
volume: 
The original Latin term dignitas hominis denotes worthiness, the outer 
aspect of a person’s social role which evokes respect, and embodies the 
charisma and the esteem presiding in office, rank or personality.  It is 
concrete dignity inherent in the rational persona, given by Nature and to 
all human beings.24 
“Well, which is it,” one might fairly inquire after reading Cancik’s opening paragraph, 
“something that accompanies social rank or something that comes with being a human 
being?”  The answer is that as far back as Cicero, dignity seems to have contained both 
meanings, and that Cancik’s first paragraph reflects evidence of this duality.25 
Another author in the Kretzmer-Klein volume, Joern Eckert, observes this same 
phenomenon relying on Cicero and the Stoics, as well as some additional ancient 
sources.26 “In ancient history, the concept of human dignity had two different 
meanings,”27 Eckert writes.  “On the one hand, it referred to the social rank of a person, 
and on the other hand, to the distinction between human beings and other creatures.”28 
Eckert points to Cicero’s “critici[sm of] democracy for not respecting the necessary 
differentiations of dignity according to rank,”29 but then as well to an early Greek idea 
 
24 Cancik supra note __ at 19. 
25 Cancik’s essay proceeds to trace dignity’s travels from pre-Christian Rome through parts of Europe and 
the United States.  His timeline concludes with the work of Kant, who, Cancik maintains, owes a debt to 
Cicero and the Stoics.  See id. at 33-34, 36-37. 
26 Joern Eckert, Legal Roots of Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 41, 43-47 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
27 Id. at 43. 
28 Id.
29 Id.
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that “the essential equality of all men was based on ‘decency and law,’ the gifts of 
Zeus… bestowed upon all men… differ[entiating men] from the animals,”30 a 
differentiation noted in the Cicero excerpt above, as well.   
One need not, therefore, choose between dignity’s two meanings.  While the 
hierarchical (or aristocratic) and egalitarian (or universalist) meanings of dignity appear 
at first to exist in a contradictory or alternative relationship, the two meanings can be 
performed simultaneously.  If rationality is what dignifies human beings according to the 
egalitarian meaning, it also places human beings in the upper stratum of a hierarchy 
between human beings and other species. 
The Kretzmer-Klein volume portrays the religious foundations of dignity 
similarly.  In Christianity, the creation of man in God’s image, the apparent dominion of 
man over other creatures, and the incarnation of Christ all cut in favor of a universalist 
meaning,31 though St. Thomas Aquinas “considered dignity differentiated according to 
rank as a principle of God.”32 And two other essays in the volume together demonstrate a 
virtually identical structure within Judaism.  The first posits that human dignity comes 
from a “democratiz[ed]” reading of the Book of Genesis according to which “every 
 
30 Id.
31 Id. at 43-44.   
32 Id. at 44.  See also Englard, supra note __ at 1908 on the Christian conception, especially as found in the 
work of Aquinas and Luther, both of which include egalitarian and hierarchical dimensions.  See also John 
Witte, Jr., Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Protestant Perspective, in ROBERT P
KRAYNAK AND GLENN TINDER EDS. IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY, ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMES 119-138 
(2004) for a reading of Luther that distinguishes between the hierarchical dignity of the priesthood and the 
egalitarian dignity of the Christian.  Jack’s note on Christianity here?  Clare’s idea that church wants 
everyone to start off wrong, sex is undignified, celibacy is dignified, marriage is a sacrament? 
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human being… is created… in [God’s] image.”33 The second, though, concludes from 
the relevant literature that dignity (kavod)
vacillates between the abstract… and the more concrete higher status and 
respect that are due to the upper hierarchical entities within any social 
structure.  Thus, intrinsic in the Rabbinical system of thought is a concept 
of dignity that contradicts any… absolute principle of human dignity.  
Human dignity in rabbinical perspective derives… from the higher divine 
dignity, and as such is also subordinated.34 
Kavod, this second writer explains, like its English counter-part, “stands for both dignity 
in its most abstract and lofty meaning as well as the most degenerated hierarchical 
concept of status and demand for subordination.”35 Note, however, that even the 
egalitarian version within Judaism relies on elevating human beings above those 
creatures which were not created in God’s image.   
The ancient sources, therefore, support the idea of a longstanding contradiction 
contained in the term dignity—that is, either all human beings have it or only those of 
high social rank have it.  It is also the case, however, that even the egalitarian version of 
dignity among human beings was enabled by a hierarchy that denied dignity to other 
animals. 
 
B. Conceptual Changes Around the Time of the Enlightenment 
 
33 Yair Lorberbaum, Blood and the Image of God: On the Sanctity of Life in Biblical and Early Rabbinic 
Law, Myth, and Ritual, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 55, 55-56 
(David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
34 Chana Safrai, Human Dignity in a Rabbinical Perspective, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 99, 99 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
35 Id. at 100.  See also Englard, supra note __ at 1908 (“in Judaism, human dignity is the result of our being 
created in the image of God”) but also see Englard’s alternative translation of kavod to mean honor, which 
connotes self-aggrandizement and was “viewed suspiciously by the sages.”  Id. at 1904. 
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Moving ahead to modernity, Eckert36 cites the natural law thinker Samuel von 
Pufendorf (1632-1694) as representative of the increasing emphasis on the gift of reason 
as the basis for human dignity, pointing out that Pufendorf was “translated into all the 
national European languages” and that his work apparently “influenced the author’s [sic] 
of the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776.”37 Around this time, a shift in conceptual priority 
away from rank and toward universal access to reason can be seen, Eckert argues, in the 
Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution and a general “loss of legitimacy for the 
traditional orders based on dignity according to hiearchical [sic] ranks.”38 Eckert also 
credits the major British Enlightenment figures with conceptual development in the 
direction of natural rights, equality and – with John Locke – a place for these concepts in 
governance.39 On the Continent, Kant is a major figure, as well, drawing on the ideals of 
the French Revolution but “emphasiz[ing] moral autonomy,”40 and so is Savigny, for “his 
doctrine of legal personality and subjective right.”41 
Under the influences of Natural Law and Enlightenment, the idea of innate 
rights of all human beings gained acceptance in Germany.  At that time, 
 
36 See also Englard, supra note __ at 1917-19, for a strikingly similar account of developments during and 
after the Enlightenment, emphasizing the contributions of Pufendorf, Locke and Kant.  Englard sees the 
Enlightenment ideas as building on “the Renaissance reaction against the pessimistic medieval vision of 
humanity.”  Id. at 1910.  Petrarch was a key link in the chain, extolling the virtues of man over animal and 
“engender[ing] a whole literary genre dedicated to the dignity of man.”  Id. at 1910-12. 
37 Eckert, supra note __ at 44.  Add cite to Meyer? 
38 Id. at 44-45. 
39 See id. at 45-46.  Locke’s conception of dignity was roomy enough to allow for slavery.  CITE.  
40 Id. at 46.  See also EDWARD J. BERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY 
AND THE UNITED STATES 42-45 (2002).  “In the dignitarian jurisprudence of the [German] Constitutional 
Court, the Court has mainly followed Kant’s theory of moral autonomy.”  Id. at 43.  There is a rich 
literature on Kantian dignity which I will not review here.  One interesting point, however, which Englard 
raises is that for Kant, “dignity was not a right to be protected, but a moral achievement—man obeying the 
self-imposed laws of reason…. The shift to a notion of dignity as a fundamental human right could 
[therefore] be achieved only by renouncing the actuality of moral freedom in persons, and replacing it with 
its general and equal potentiality in human beings.”  Englard, supra note __ at 1921.    
41 Eckert, supra note __ at 50. 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
Dignity & Degradation 11 11/10/2006 
the traditional idea that man is a person because God is a person and man 
is created in his image became secularized.42 
The Enlightenment and its devotion to reason was therefore crucial to the evolution of the 
secular universalist version of dignity, having landed on the fertile soil of pre-existing 
acceptance of universal dignity, albeit based on creationism.  As the ideas of the 
Enlightenment spread, the aristocratic version of dignity was less and less in evidence.  In 
an essay pointedly entitled Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue, Michael J. Meyer proposes that 
modernity itself can be characterized as  
the general tendency to reject… the ideology of aristocracy.  
Otherwise put, modern thought generally tends to reject 
(natural or hereditary) moral and political hierarchies as 
normative ideals.  This aspect of modern thought is, for 
example, displayed in Kant’s moral philosophy as opposed 
to, say, Aristotle or Burke.43 
So, during the Enlightenment, the universality of the capacity for reason as a basis for 
dignity displaced the pre-Enlightenment commitment to rank and hierarchy.  Dignity 
seemed to evolve into an egalitarian, universalizing, Enlightenment concept.  This 
“recognition of… universal and equal human dignity” came to have “political and legal 
effect”44 in German law45 and eventually in the form “of universal human rights.”46 
42 Id. at 49. 
43 Michael J. Meyer, Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 195, 202 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
44 Eckert supra note __. at 45. 
45 Id. at 51-52. 
46 Id. at 45. 
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C. The Aftermath of Fascism in Europe  
Skipping ahead to the second half of the twentieth century, Eckert concludes with 
the apparently obvious:  
The idea of human dignity was decisively strengthened by developments 
after the Second World War.  After the terrible crimes and contempt 
towards mankind by the Nazis, there was a sudden surge for stronger 
protection of human dignity.47 
As evidence, Eckert points to key provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Charter of the United Nations and post-war German constitutional texts.48 
Other authors in the Kretzmer-Klein volume, such as Yehoshua Arieli, underscore 
Eckert’s final point: 
[T]he invocation of dignity and rights of man has to be seen as a counter-
thesis and counter-ideology of the Free World to the ideologies of the Axis 
Powers and in particular to National Socialism.49 
Arieli’s essay echoes many of the points already made above.  He sees dignity and its 
embrace in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “the direct offspring of the 
great ideas of the 18th century Enlightenment, of the American and French revolutions, of 
the movement toward democracy and of liberalism,”50 and also as directly responsive to 
 
47 Id. at 52. 
48 See id. at 52-53. 
49 Yehoshua Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the 
Dignity of Man and His Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1, 3 
(David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
50 Id. at 5. 
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the Holocaust.51 His understanding of dignity is universalist and secular (i.e., grounded 
in access to reason rather than in man’s having been created in the image of God).52 
D. Revisiting the Key Points in the Conventional Narrative 
 The first purpose of my review of these accounts exemplified by the Kretzmer-
Klein volume is that the concept of dignity can be traced back quite a long ways along 
two etymological strands, one universalist and egalitarian, sometimes theological and 
sometimes secular, and the other oriented toward hierarchy and distinction based on 
social status.  While the two meanings were in some sense conflicting (did all people or 
just aristocrats have dignity?), the egalitarian version relied on a hierarchy between 
human beings and other species.   
Next, I wanted to use this summary to demonstrate two conventions, each related 
to the importance of a particular historical juncture: First, I wanted to show the extent to 
which the Enlightenment and related historical events (American and French revolutions 
and the Protestant Reformation) have been credited not only with secularizing the 
universalist version of dignity by stressing access to reason over creationism, but also 
with delegitimizing and edging out the aristocratic version of the concept. As one writer 
sees it: 
Human dignity is man’s position in the world, his 
uniqueness in the cosmos, and no longer his position in a 
social-functional relationship vis-á-vis his peers…. The 
shift to the cosmic aspect is a shift from the functional or 
 
51 See id. at 1. 
52 See id. at 8, 16. 
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performing character of dignity to the given and inherent 
status of man.  It is pari passu a shift from certain particular 
individuals to the universal texture of human existence.53 
So the first convention—found in Kretzmer-Klein and beyond—is that 
during the Enlightenment there was a shift in the meaning of dignity from 
hierarchical to universal.54 
Second, I wanted to air the commonly held view that the Nazis’ total 
abandonment of the universalist principle demanded a resurgence of universal dignity 
and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a number of European and other 
national constitutions and basic laws asserted preeminence of the concept in the post-war 
years precisely because of the Nazis’ disregard for it.55 
53 Englard, supra note __ at 1905 (citing NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, MAN AND HIS DIGNITY 12-13 (1983)). 
54 As Englard points out, however, “it should be noted that the original meaning of dignity as a function of 
the individual’s social rank continued to be widely used alongside this relatively newer sense of humanity’s 
intrinsic value.”  Id. at 1906 (citing Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s Conception of Dignity and Modern Political 
Thought, 8 HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 319, 330 n. 10 (1987)).  This is a point I hope to make 
elaborately as the article proceeds.   
55 Of course this idea can be found in sources well beyond the Kretzmer-Klein volume.  See Berle, supra 
note __ at 41 (“Human dignity is a central value of the [German] Basic Law.  This determination reflects 
the conscious intention to elevate modern Germany beyond the inhumanity of Nazism, signaling a new 
constitutional order.”).  See also Englard, supra note __ at 1920-21 (“Ferdinand Lasalle… relat[ed dignity] 
to the material conditions of the working classes.  He demanded that these conditions be improved in order 
to achieve for them a ‘dignified’ human existence… It was… in this sense that the notion of dignity was 
first introduced into the Weimar Constitution of 1919…. [But] it was the Kantian notion of dignity’s 
absolute and intrinsic character that promoted its inclusion into modern constitutions and human rights 
conventions in the wake of Nazi Germany’s crimes during World War II.”). 
 Even the dignity guarantee in Montana’s state constitution has been traced to events in Europe that 
took place decades earlier.  Montana, which adopted its provision in 1972, was apparently influenced by a 
similar provision in the Puerto Rican constitution of 1951, which in turn “was part of a wave of post World 
War II constitution making” and drew on “language and ideas from… international human rights 
documents.”  Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational 
Constitutional Discourse 65 MONT L. REV. 15, 23-25 (2004). 
Cf. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER (2004).  Central to Kagan’s thesis regarding the conflicting tendencies of Europe and the United 
States with regard to the use of unilateral force is that Europe is ideologically and psychologically inclined 
toward the constraints of international law, diplomacy and persuasion and that European nations have 
largely declined to devote the resources necessary to make themselves powerful in the military sense 
because of the European experience during World War II.  Kagan’s book is not about constitutional law or 
the legal concept of dignity, but his view is consistent with the “second convention,” especially his 
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 This second convention has been taken up by James Q. Whitman, who offers a 
more complex account.56 Whitman argues that rather than understanding post-war 
European dignity as an abrupt resurgence following a period of hibernation, the concept 
can be traced back through the Nazi era and owes some of its post-war characteristics to 
developments that occurred during that time.57 He observes: 
The new Europe is founded on a forthright rejection of the fascist past.  
This is a commonplace…. Perhaps most of all it is a commonplace that we 
repeat when we discuss the European embrace of the values of ‘dignity,’ 
and… ‘human dignity.’…. In the literature on all these areas of law we 
find forthright rejection of the legacy of the fascist era, and especially of 
the horrors of Nazism.58 
But, Whitman contends, the history is “messier”59 than this narrative suggests.  Whitman 
locates important pieces of dignity’s history in “Nazi law aimed to vindicate claims of 
‘honour,’”60 and sets forth a richer narrative according to which “old norms of ‘honour,’ 
norms that applied only to aristocrats and a few other high-status categories of persons in 
 
attribution of the European preference for international liberal legalism to the legacy of the fascist era.  
See., e.g., id. at 55. 
56 See generally James Q. Whitman, On Nazi ‘Honour’ and the New European ‘Dignity,’ in DARKER 
LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS 




60 Id. at 245.  It is worth pointing out, however, that while Whitman argues that the history of European 
dignity is not always pretty, he has suggested elsewhere that he is still something of a fan of the concept.  
See, e.g., Gabrielle S. Friedman and James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment 
Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 243 (2003) (expressing a preference for an 
emphasis on dignity in harassment law).  See also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (in which he appears at least to disapprove of 
traces of parochialism in American thinking about privacy, which does not take dignity concerns as 
seriously as European privacy law does).  
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have gradually been extended to the entire 
population.”61 
For example, Whitman examines the contemporary German law of “insult,” 
including the cause of action available to Germans who have been insulted individually, 
(e.g., by an obscene gesture), as well as “collective insult,” protecting minorities from 
insulting or degrading treatment,” (i.e., “hate speech”), and finds doctrinal roots in laws 
from the Nazi era designed to protect the SS from disrespect.62 These laws find their 
antecedents in an earlier law of insult, which followed in turn from the norms attendant 
upon the practice of dueling.63 
Like its predecessor, the law of insult that grew out of dueling norms “was careful 
to distinguish between persons who were ‘satisfaktionsfähig’ [honorable enough to 
engage in a duel] and persons who were not.”64 Though it was a slow historical process, 
Whitman asserts that it was finally with the advent of Nazism that the “right to take 
offence [was] generalised throughout German society”65 so that, beginning in the 1930’s 
and today, even low-status Germans can assert claims under the law of insult.66 
This development, as Whitman explains, was entirely consistent with Nazi 
populism.  “Everybody who counted as a member of the Volk-community was a person 
of ‘honour,’ in Nazi ideology.”67 Relying on examples related to the contemporary law 
of insult as well as to developments in German labor law, Whitman makes a compelling 
case that Europe’s dignity “is the latest stage in [a] long process of the social extension of 
 
61 Whitman supra note __ at 245. 
62 See id. at 249-51. 
63 See id. at 249. 
64 Id. at 247, 250. 
65 Id. at 250. 
66 See id.
67 Id. at 246.   
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norms of honour: ‘human dignity’ for everybody, as it exists at the end of the twentieth 
century, means definitive admission to high social status for everybody,”68 or, put even 
more starkly, “[l]ow-status Germans who learned to believe that they were ‘honourable’ 
persons in the 1930s became Europeans who believed they [were] entitled to ‘human 
dignity’ after 1945.”69 
Whitman writes to problematize the second convention, according to which 
dignity’s post-Holocaust revival constituted a total rebuke of Nazism.70 The advent of 
post-war European dignity was not abrupt, but evolved before, during and after the Nazi 
era.   
I appropriate Whitman’s analysis, however, to problematize as well the first 
convention drawn from the accounts above: that during the Enlightenment, when the 
universalist version of dignity assumed a position in the fore, the aristocratic strand 
withered.  The Nazi promise to extend access to honor to the entire German Volk was 
seductive to ordinary Germans precisely because they imagined themselves to be rising in 
social status.     
It probably strikes the contemporary reader as absurd, the notion that high status 
could possibly be extended to everyone, but, as Whitman sensitively observes, 
 
68 Id.
69 Id. But see Gerald L. Neuman, On Fascist Honour and Human Dignity: A Sceptical Response, in 
DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER 
EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS 267 (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds. 2003).  “It is 
unclear how strong an explanatory force Professor Whitman claims for his central thesis, how much of 
human dignity would be ‘best understood, from the sociological point of view, as a generalization of old 
norms of social honour.’  Undoubtedly, there is some connection between human dignity and honour… [but 
Neuman believes that] some concerns would arise if [Whitman’s thesis] were overextended.”  Id. at 272. 
70 Whitman, supra note __ at 243.  Neuman confirms Whitman’s observation that there is a “prevailing 
assumption that the post-War ascendancy of the value of human dignity result from a reaction against 
Fascism.” Neuman supra note ___ at 268. 
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[W]e have lost much of our capacity to really empathize with the yearning 
for respectability that gripped people eighty years ago. This makes it very 
hard for us to grasp the power of what the Nazis said, when they spoke, as 
they did so incessantly, about ‘honour’ for all Germans.  People cared 
intensely about whether they were treated as persons of ‘honour’ or not; 
and a political formula, like the Nazi formula, that promised honour for 
everybody had real potency.71 
Even as populism reigned, therefore, aristocratic values remained very much alive in the 
fantasy of social ascent.  Whitman’s argument that post-war European dignity evolved 
out this populism suggests that post-war European dignity contains aristocratic elements, 
as well.72 
Of course—crucially—not everyone counted as a member of the German Volk-
community.  We can understand those who did not as serving the same analytic purpose 
that animals served in the older sources, i.e., as constituting the lower stratum of a 
hierarchy that enables egalitarianism within the upper stratum.73 Invocation of dignity 
even as an egalitarian concept establishes a structure whereby something is degraded as a 
matter of analytic necessity.   
The next part discusses a handful of constitutional cases governing sex that, read 
closely, evidence a parallel structure.  My analysis of those cases is an effort to show that 
even in a legal culture in which the notion of aristocratic dignity is likely to be viewed as 
 
71 Whitman, supra note __ at 248. 
72 Neuman also “agree[s] that historically the modern commitment to human dignity derives from 
interaction of egalitarianism with the differential dignity of a stratified society.”  Id. at 267-68. 
73 In fact, “the anthropocentric Kantian notion of dignity has been attacked by animal rights advocates on 
the ground of its ‘speciesism.’”  Englard supra note __ at 1922. 
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quaint at best and morally backward at worst, the hierarchical dimension of dignity 
remains in play in powerful and subtle ways.   
 
III. The Sex Cases 
The Stoics, the Greeks, the Christians and the Jews all emphasized that dignity 
was reserved for human beings only.  Rationality distinguishes us from the animals, over 
which we are supposed to exercise dominion.  Moreover, human beings, unlike beasts, 
can control their drives; they can choose between sensuality and reason.  Cicero urged: 
We should never forget… how much the nature of man 
transcends that of the rest of the animal kingdom.  Animals 
are motivated solely by physical pleasure, and all their 
impulses tend to that end; man on the other hand has a 
rational mind which is fed by thought and learning…. But 
if a man is too prone to succumb to sensual pleasures, he 
should beware of becoming an animal.  There are in fact 
those who are human in name only…. It is thus apparent 
that physical pleasure is quite unworthy of human dignity 
and should be scorned and rejected.74 
One might predict, reading this history, a tendency in modern law to regard sex as 
undignified, belonging to man’s baser, more animalistic aspect.  Yet the materials that my 
research turned up suggest that courts are more inclined to imagine sex as dignified, and 
to protect the dignity of sex – against the sundry species of threats that sex faces.   
 
74 CICERO supra note __ at 76.  See also Cancik supra note __ at 25-26 and Starck supra note __ at 183 
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The cases discussed in this part are drawn exclusively from “modern” legal 
cultures, in the sense of having at least ostensibly embraced the Enlightenment value of 
egalitarianism and in which aristocracy and related ideas of natural or familial hierarchy 
have been discredited, at least as an aspirational matter.  I have concerned myself only 
with cases in which there is a resort to the notion of dignity— presumably in its 
egalitarian-universalist valence—as a (not necessarily the) basis for providing or denying 
constitutional protection to a sexual practice.75 
Consider, to begin with, Lawrence v. Texas,76 the 2003 decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, striking down a state sodomy prohibition on substantive due 
process grounds.  Dignity – hardly a staple in American jurisprudence77 – makes an 
appearance in Justice Kennedy’s78 opinion for the majority when he states that anti-
sodomy statutes  
 
75 My claim is not that dignity will be used the same way in every case, nor that judicial decisions would be 
certain to come out differently if the notion of dignity were removed or redefined.  Still, the transhistorical 
and transnational usage of dignity in an ostensibly egalitarian valence without explicit recognition of its 
aristocratic current suggests the possibility of an underestimated discursive force and calls out for critique. 
76 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
77 It has shown up a few times in Supreme Court decisions on matters of criminal law and punishment, 
especially regarding the Eighth Amendment (e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, 
J., concurring)) and at least once in a case regarding the right to die (Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)), but does not rise to the level of a doctrine in American law, at least not 
at the federal level.  See Luis Aníbal Avilés Pagán, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality Rights in the 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 
Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 343 (1998) (“The presence of the phrase human dignity in the jurisprudence of the U.S. 
Supreme Court is, at most, very tenuous; it is relegated to a background of extra-constitutional principles. 
Its mention surfaces most of the time in the glosses some Justices add to their dissenting opinions, and then, 
most notably, in cases involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8th Amendment.  The main 
reason the values of human dignity and autonomy do not arise in constitutional litigation is that they are not 
explicitly contained in the text of the Constitution.”)  Id. at 360.  See also DAVID E. MARION, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY”
(1997). Finally, see Gabrielle S. Friedman and James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of 
Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 245 (2003) (“European sexual 
harassment law came to revolve around concepts of “dignity” that have never mustered any real interest, or 
even sustained attention, in American Law.”)   The constitutions of a few states and Puerto Rico, however, 
do contain dignity clauses (see LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 4; 
and P.R. CONST. Art. II, § 1).   
78 Jeffrey Toobin article in New Yorker Magazine on J. Kennedy’s interest in transnationalism. 
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seek to control a personal relationship that… is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as 
criminals. 
 
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by 
the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the 
relationship or to set its boundaries…. [A]dults may choose 
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their 
dignity as free persons.79 
Not to put too fine a point on it, but it is important for my purposes to observe that the 
“relationship” to which Justice Kennedy repeatedly refers is the physical relationship of 
oral-genital or genital-anal contact, or one person penetrating another with an object,80 
any of which he might have described strictly as “engaging in an activity,” rather than 
“enter[ing] upon [a] relationship.”  The opinion continues “[w]hen sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element 
in a personal bond that is more enduring.”81 You will find no assertion that the two men 
appealing their sodomy convictions had any plans to form an enduring personal bond; 
still, that a long-term relationship might provide the context for sodomy seems important 
to Justice Kennedy, though he does not tell us why or state this forthrightly.   
 
79 Lawrence at 568. 
80 Id. at __.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). 
81 Id. at 568. 
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Moreover, in criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick,82 which Lawrence purports to 
overrule,83 Justice Kennedy employs a marital analogy.  In Bowers, Justice White 
infamously stated that “[t]he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”84 His answer, of course, was 
no.85 “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct,” Justice Kennedy rebuked him in Lawrence “demeans the claim the individual 
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”86 
I have written elsewhere that it is unclear why a claim is “demeaned” for being 
understood to regard sex alone.87 Justice Kennedy never squarely confronts whether a 
one-night stand and a sexual act that takes place in the course of an enduring personal 
bond are equally entitled to constitutional protection, though to be sure, the case does not 
exclude one-night stands from its purview.  Here, though, I want to zero in on the nature 
of the threat that Justice Kennedy sees to the dignity of persons who engage in acts of 
sodomy.  The sexual acts themselves are not the threat; the sexual actors do not demean 
themselves.  Persons who engage in sodomy “still retain their dignity.”  The threat, the 
demeaning force, is Justice White’s characterization of the issue in Bowers, specifically – 
 
82 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
83 Lawrence at 579.  I say “purports to overrule” because, as Justice Scalia observed in his dissent, 
Lawrence does not explicitly create a fundamental right to engage in sodomy and so may leave intact a 
central holding of Bowers. Id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84 Bowers at 190. 
85 Bowers at __. 
86 Id. at 566. 
87 My initial thoughts about this case, and in particular about its references to dignity, appear in The Future 
of Sodomy, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 215-218 (2005). 
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as the marital analogy makes clear – the dissociation of the sexual act from the intimate 
relationship in which it might occur.88 
As a case note in the journal Law and Sexuality89 explains, “[i]n contrast to 
Bowers, the Court characterized the claim [in Lawrence] as the right of adults to define 
the meaning of their relationships.”90 In furtherance of its analysis, the Lawrence Court 
characterized Griswold as holding that a privacy right… 
protects the marital relation[,] [then found later in 
Eisenstadt that] “the relation-centered… privacy right 
found in Griswold applies equally to nonmarital 
relationships [and concluded that] the rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment include the right to make 
decisions concerning the most intimate and personal of 
choices – those that serve to define a person and her 
relationships and those needed to retain autonomy and 
dignity.91 
This commentator surmised that Lawrence “may represent an emerging doctrine where 
laws cannot be said to be drawn to a legitimate state interest if their primary effect and 
purpose is to demean, stigmatize, and control private and intimate relationships.”92 
Regardless of the accuracy of this doctrinal prediction, the marriage analogy 
combined with Justice Kennedy’s raising the possibility of an enduring personal bond 
 
88 Justice Kennedy’s marriage analogy skips carelessly between demeaning a claim and demeaning the 
claimants, but I do not think that very much rides on his (or my) being precise in that regard. 
89 Jeffrey Goehring, Lawrence v. Texas: Dignity, A New Standard for Substantive Rational Basis Review? 
13 LAW & SEXUALITY 727 (2004). 
90 Id. at 734. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 736. 
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even where none was asserted suggests that an apologist’s burden weighed on Justice 
Kennedy.  It seems he felt that if he were going to speak in the language of dignity, two 
men meeting at a bar or a cruising spot and going home to one man’s house for a one-
time encounter was not going to serve him well.93 The threat to the dignity of the sexual 
actors is the suggestion that their acts are merely sex, rather than one facet of a broader 
relationship.  By invoking the image of an enduring bond—actual or potential—Justice 
Kennedy plausibly lends dignity to the enterprise of sodomy.    
In Jordan v. State,94 three criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of 
various provisions of South Africa’s Sexual Offences Act.95 Section 20(1)(aA) of the Act 
provides that “[a]ny person who…. has unlawful carnal intercourse, or commits acts of 
indecency, with any other person for reward…. shall be guilty of an offence.”96 This 
section was struck down by South Africa’s High Court, which determined that it 
discriminated against women in violation of the constitutional right to equality because it 
targets the purveyor of sex to the exclusion of the purchaser.97 The South African 
Constitutional Court reversed, however, finding the terms of the Act to be gender-
 
93 Cf. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (holding that licensing restrictions on 
motel room rentals for ten or fewer hours did not impose “an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
freedom of association recognized in Roberts v. United States Jaycees [because the Court did not believe 
that said restrictions] will have any discernable effect on the sorts of traditional bonds to which we referred 
in Roberts.”)  
94 Jordan v. State cite 
95 CITE ACT.   
 There was some question in the case about whether South Africa’s Constitution or Interim 
Constitution should be applied.  The Court determined that the question was of no material consequence to 
the case, but applied the Interim Constitution based on the dates of the facts giving rise to the case. 
One of the defendants owned a brothel and was thus most concerned with the prohibition against 
running such a business, another appears to have been employed as a cashier of sorts, and the third 
performed a sexual act for pay, and so was likely most concerned with the section of the Act that prohibited 
the sale of sex.  My analysis will focus on the third defendant’s concern.  
96 
97 
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neutral98 and suggesting that the provision could easily have been designed for the 
sensible purpose of targeting the more likely repeat-offender in a sex-for-reward 
bargain.99 The Constitutional Court rejected appellants’ other constitutional claims, as 
well, including claims related to freedom and security of the person, privacy, the right to 
engage in economic activity, and the right to human dignity.100 
In their separate opinion, Justices O’Regan and Sachs concurred with the majority 
in all respects except one: in accord with the High Court, they would have found that the 
sex-for-reward provision, “to the extent that it renders criminal the conduct of the 
prostitutes, but not that of customers,” discriminates unconstitutionally on the basis of 
gender.101 To reach their conclusion, they first considered “whether the impugned 
provision differentiates between people or categories of people and if it does, whether it 
does so rationally.”102 Finding that “[i]t cannot be said that it is irrational for the 
Legislature to criminalize the conduct of only one group and not the other,”103 they 
proceeded to their second step, i.e., “whether a differentiation is made, directly or 
indirectly on a ground which could be said to have the potential to impair human 
dignity.”104 If the answer to the second inquiry is yes, “the question that then arises is 
whether it is unfair.”105 
It is important to observe that this portion of the opinion does not regard the 
constitutional provision guaranteeing a right to human dignity.  The Act’s sustainability 
 
98 par. 9 
99 par. 10 
100 par. 51 conc/dissent.  
Country-specific history of dignity/ubutu in South Africa. 
101 par. 71.  The customer could face criminal liability as an “accomplice or accessory,” but this did not 
rescue the statute in the view of the dissenting justices.  Par. 58, n. 21 
102 par. 57 
103 par. 58 
104 par. 57 
105 par. 57 
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under that constitutional provision will be taken up by these two justices later.  Here, 
Justices O’Regan and Sachs are concerned with the constitutional guarantee of equality,
which as an interpretive matter, involves the question of “whether a differentiation 
[might] impair human dignity.”106 
The gender-neutral language of the statute notwithstanding, Justices O’Regan and 
Sachs were “satisfied that… this is a case where an apparently neutral differentiating 
criterion producing a markedly differential impact on a listed ground [i.e., gender] results 
in indirect discrimination on that ground.”107 Nor were Justices O’Regan and Sachs 
persuaded by the idea that law enforcement attention was simply being directed toward 
the more likely repeat offender:   
We see no reason why the plier of sex for money should be 
treated as more blameworthy than the client.  If anything, 
the fact that the male customers will generally come from a 
class that is more economically powerful might suggest the 
reverse.  To suggest… that women may be targeted for 
prosecution because they are merchants of sex and not 
 
106 par. 57 (emphasis added).  The South Africans have debated the utility of the concept of dignity to 
constitutional analysis under the equality guarantee.  Some argue that reliance on the concept of dignity 
undermines the redistributive potential of the equality provision.  See, e.g., D.M. Davis, Equality: The 
Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFRICAN L.J. 398 (1999).  But see Susie Cowen, Can ‘Dignity’ 
Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?, 17 S. AFRICAN J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (2001) for a 
contrary view.  More broadly, the South Africans also have struggled over the extent to which the separate 
constitutional clause guaranteeing dignity requires the affirmative provision of such necessities as decent 
housing even where state resources are not adequate to the task.  See Chaskalson supra note __.  The debate 
over dignity’s relationship to socio-economic rights has traction even beyond the South African context.  
See, e.g., Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead 
the Way to an Expanded Interpretation, 64 MONT. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003) (proposing that Montana’s 
inclusion of a dignity clause in its state constitution “provides a basis for possible claims to a limited core 
of socio-economic rights”).  Socio-economic rights are not the topic of this paper, but it is possible that 
socio-economics and sex (conceived as acts taken by and upon bodies, as opposed, say, to as an expression 
of love) raise parallel issues in relation to the concept of dignity, which is sometimes invoked with a 
tendency toward the abstract and may obscure material concerns.  Cf. infra parts V and VI. 
107 par. 60 
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patrons is to turn the real-life sociological situation upside-
down.108 
But it was not merely this sociological reversal that troubled the two justices.  The 
provision’s exclusive focus on the purveyor “brand[ing] the prostitute as the primary 
offender,” imposes a “social stigma.”109 
The female prostitute has been the social outcast, the male 
patron has been accepted or ignored.  She is visible and 
denounced, her existence tainted by her activity.  He is 
faceless, a mere ingredient in her offence rather than a 
criminal in his own right, who returns to respectability after 
the encounter…. The difference… tracks a pattern of 
applying different standards to the sexuality of men and 
women….  The inference is that the primary cause of the 
problem is not the man who creates the demand but the 
woman who responds to it: she is fallen, he is at best virile, 
at worst weak.  Such discrimination, therefore, has the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity and 
personhood of women.110 
Noting that many women “become involved in prostitution because they have few 
or no alternatives,”111 and that “the differentiation [in the Act] tracks and reinforces in a 
 
108 par. 68 
109 par. 63 
110 par. 64-65 
111 par. 66.  Interestingly, while Justices O’Regan and Sachs appear sympathetic in the equality analysis 
regarding the possibility that prostitutes “have few or no alternatives,” the two justices nonetheless 
concurred with the majority that the prostitutes could not succeed on their claim under the constitutional 
provision guaranteeing South Africans the right to earn a living. 
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profound way double standards regarding the expression of male and female 
sexuality,”112 Justices O’Regan and Sachs concluded that the suggestion that “male 
patrons… are somehow less blameworthy” is unfair.113 
The two justices were careful not to excuse entirely the prostitute’s behavior.114 
Still, in the equality analysis, while considering women as a class that is 
disproportionately affected by the criminal prohibition, their opinion treats prostitutes as 
passive objects of stigmatization, victimized by some combination of social, economic 
and legal forces.  It is this stigmatization, in comparison with the easy anonymity enjoyed 
by male clientele, along with the entrenchment of “double standards” regarding sexual 
behavior, that constitute the impairment to the dignity of women.   
Justices O’Regan and Sachs have performed a feminist analysis, focusing on the 
relative financial and social power of most men compared with that of most women115 – 
something that is ipso facto unfair.  They have also shown the law to be participating in 
this unfairness by its quiet, ostensibly neutral reproduction of women’s blameworthiness 
and men’s blamelessness.       
Recall, however, that Justices O’Regan and Sachs dissented only from the 
majority’s equality holding.  They concurred in rejecting appellants’ claim regarding the 
constitutional provision that guarantees that “[e]very person shall have the right to respect 
 
112 par. 67 
113 par. 68 
114 par. 66 
115 This is only one feminist analysis, of course.  Some feminists might object instead to the justices’ 
presentation of the prostitutes as passive objects of stigmatization, or to the generalization regarding the 
lack of choice that prompts one to sell sex for a living.  (See, e.g., Margo St. James, The Reclamation of 
Whores, in GOOD GIRLS / BAD GIRLS: FEMINISTS AND SEX TRADE WORKERS FACE TO FACE, 81, 82-84 
(Laurie Bell ed., 1987)).  I have no intention here of entering the debate about women’s agency or lack 
thereof in the context of prostitution.  I highlight the portrayal of the prostitutes as passive because the same 
justices are going to present the same women differently in their analysis of the dignity claim and I am 
interested in that contrast.  
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for and protection of his or her dignity.”116 In analyzing whether the sex-for-reward 
provision violated the constitutional right to dignity, the two justices reasoned: 
Our Constitution values human dignity which inheres in 
various aspects of what it means to be a human being.  One 
of these aspects is the fundamental dignity of the human 
body which is not simply organic.  Neither is it something 
to be commodified.  Our Constitution requires that it be 
respected.  We do not believe that section 20(1)(aA) can be 
said to be the cause of any limitation on the dignity of the 
prostitute.  To the extent that the dignity of prostitutes is 
diminished, the diminution arises from the character of 
prostitution itself.  The very nature of prostitution is the 
commodification of one’s body.  Even though we accept 
that prostitutes may have few alternatives to prostitution, 
the dignity of prostitutes is diminished not by section 
20(1)(aA) but by their engaging in commercial sex work.  
The very character of the work they undertake devalues the 
 
116 Par. 51 of case, par 8 of const.  The history of the South African concept of dignity closely tracks the 
history of the idea in the West.  It finds its roots in the Latin dignitas, sometimes translated with the double-
edged meaning “worth,” and was included in the South African constitution as a rejoinder to the denial of 
human dignity to black South Africans who “were treated as means to an end and hardly ever as an end in 
themselves; an almost complete reversal of the Kantian imperative and concept of priceless inner worth and 
dignity.”  Cowen, supra note __ at 42-43 (citing Makwanyane).  The African concept of ubuntu, which also 
has appeared in decisions of the South African Constitutional Court, has been construed in a manner 
consistent with the Kantian ideal, i.e., as “the recognition of human worth and respect for the dignity of 
every person.”  Id. at 50, n. 78 (citing Makwanyane).  See also R.B. Mqeke, Customary Law and Human 
Rights, 113 S. AFRICAN L.J. 364 (1996) for a discussion of the compatibility of African customary law, and 
ubuntu in particular, with international human rights norms. 
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respect that the Constitution regards as inherent in the 
human body.117 
Observe how differently the prostitutes are portrayed here, and also how differently the 
law is portrayed.  In their equality analysis, where the treatment of a group consisting 
mainly of women (prostitutes) is compared to the treatment of a group consisting mainly 
of men (customers), Justices O’Regan and Sachs depicted women as passive objects, and 
the law as unfairly complicit in the stigmatization of and discrimination against women.  
Here, the prostitutes are themselves responsible for any loss of dignity they suffer 
because they have undertaken work that commodifies their bodies.  The law is no longer 
a force that acts in conjunction with economic and social forces to impair women’s 
dignity.  Women who sell sex do that to themselves. 
 In a footnote, the two justices explain their sudden shift: 
We have already dealt with the impact on the dignity of 
prostitutes caused by their being treated differently from 
their male patrons.  The very fact of differential treatment 
by the criminal law of prostitutes and customers implicates 
the dignity of all women, and results in indirect 
discrimination.  Here we are concerned not with differential 
impact as between customers and prostitutes, but with the 
question of whether the criminal prohibition on its own and 
regardless of whether it also criminalizes the conduct of 
 
117 Par. 74 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
Dignity & Degradation 31 11/10/2006 
customers results in a diminution of the dignity of 
prostitutes.118 
The dignity of all women is impaired by the differential impact of the sex-for-reward 
provision.  When extricated from the question of equality, however, the sale of sex itself, 
its “very character,” brings indignity on the purveyor.  It is the sale of sex that causes the 
indignity; there is no suggestion that sex itself impairs human dignity.  In fact, the statute 
protects sex and bodies against the threat posed by commodification.  This point is made 
additionally clear in the privacy discussion. 
 In their argument that the sex-for-reward provision contravenes the 
constitutionally guaranteed “right to… personal privacy,”119 “appellants relied heavily on 
[the] decision in the Gay and Lesbian Coalition (Sodomy) case”120 in which the South 
African Constitutional Court struck down the common law offense of sodomy occurring 
between men as well as some related statutory provisions,121 on equality, privacy and 
dignity grounds.122 Majority and concurring justices in this case devote significant space 
to anti-gay discrimination and its relationship to the privacy and dignity of 
homosexuals.123 The opinions are lengthy and rich on those points.  I wish to direct 
attention only to one small piece.   
In an effort to draw the connection between privacy and dignity, the majority 
explains: “[p]rivacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
 
118 par. 74, n. 30.  One piece of the debate over the whether dignity ought to underlie the equality provision 
is the question whether, absent a dignity conception, equality is merely a comparative concept, devoid of 
any independent content.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note __ at 400 (citing, but ultimately rejecting, Peter 
Westin, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982)). 
119 par. 51, cont’l par 13 
120 par. 82, citing . 
121 Sodomy case par 106 
122 sodomy case par 30. 
123 Sodomy case pars 15-27 and 107-138 
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autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without 
interference from the outside community.  The way in which we give expression to our 
sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy.”124 Observe the similarity to 
Justice Kennedy’s image of sodomy in Lawrence, i.e., as incident to a broader 
relationship.  Moreover, the majority in the South African sodomy case points out that the 
challenged prohibition “criminalises all sexual intercourse per anum between men: 
regardless of the relationship of the couple who engage therein, of the age of such couple, 
of the place where it occurs, or indeed of any other circumstances whatsoever.”125 The 
Court discusses the prohibition against non-consensual sodomy elsewhere in the 
opinion;126 and of course privacy is amply discussed, as well, but this leaves open the 
question of in what “relationship” or “other circumstances” the justices thought sodomy 
might be properly restricted.  Perhaps they were thinking about incest, teacher-student 
sex, or doctor-patient sex – or perhaps they were contemplating the lesser injustice of the 
prohibition against same-sex sodomy when applied to strangers as compared with 
intimates.  There is no way to know for sure.  What is clear from the opinion, however, is 
the Court’s emphasis on intimacy and the establishment and nurturance of human 
relationships as the link between dignity and privacy.    
 But “that case highlights points of contrast rather than of correspondence,”127 with 
the challenge to the sex-for-reward provision, in the view of Justices O’Regan and Sachs.  
For starters, the sodomy case had gay identity going for it. “[W]hat was at stake in that 
matter was a not just a privacy interest, but an equality one.  Indeed, the principal 
 
124 sodomy par 32 
125 sodomy par 28 
126 sodomy pars 65-73 
127 Par. 82 
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complaint of the gay community was that they were being subjected by the law to unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.”128 Justices O’Regan and Sachs also 
observed that the sodomy decision employs overlapping conceptions of “equality, dignity 
and privacy in relation to a community that had been discriminated against on the basis of 
closely-held personal characteristics.  Furthermore,” (and more significantly for my 
purposes,) the sodomy decision, “stresses that the protected sphere of private intimacy 
and autonomy relates to establishing and nurturing human relationships.”129 Not so in the 
case of prostitution:   
[I]t is the very institution of commercial sex that serves to 
reinforce patterns of inequality.  Moreover, central to the 
character of prostitution is that it is indiscriminate and 
loveless.  It is accordingly not the form of intimate sexual 
expression that is penalized, nor the fact that the parties 
possess a certain identity.  It is that the sex is both 
indiscriminate and for reward.  The privacy element falls 
far short of ‘deep attachment and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not 
only a special community of thoughts, experiences and 
beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one’s life.’  
 
128 par. 82   
The importance of gay identity to gay dignity might easily sustain another article.  It would recount the 
Lawrence, S. African cases, maybe Goodridge?, Mv. H and Vriend v. Alberta…  A critique of the 
entrenchment of gay identity in this context might easily rely on past critiques of gay identity on anti-
discrimination and privacy contexts.  See., e.g., Janet Halley, Jeb Rubenfeld, Libby Adler. Also, Law v. 
Canada, Michelman on S. Africa and the tranny case from K-K @ 130 and German con law book. 
The prostitutes in Jordan made an equality claim, as well, but again, the question in this part of the 
case regards the constitutionality of the ban on prostitution generally, rather than whether purveyors and 
clients are equally targeted by the law. 
129 par. 82 
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By making her sexual services available for hire to 
strangers in the marketplace, the sex worker empties the 
sex act of much of its private and intimate character.  She is 
not nurturing relationships or taking life-affirming 
decisions about birth, marriage or family; she is making 
money.130 
Justices O’Regan and Sachs reached essentially the same conclusion as the majority on 
this claim, though their precise take is that the Act does limit the prostitute’s privacy 
right, but – unlike in the South African sodomy case – not much, and not unjustifiably.131 
The majority’s analysis, including its distinguishing the prostitutes’ privacy claim from 
the one made in the sodomy case, was brief, but pretty much the same. 
There the offence that was the subject of the constitutional 
challenge infringed the right of gay people not to be 
discriminated against unfairly, and also their right to 
dignity.  It intruded into ‘the sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human 
relationships without interference from the outside 
community’ and in doing so affected the sexuality of gay 
people ‘at the core of the area of private intimacy.’  None 
of those considerations are present here. 
 
130 par. 83 
131 Pars. 84, 94. 
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This case is concerned with the commercial exploitation of 
sex, which as I have found, involves neither an 
infringement of dignity nor unfair discrimination.132 
The key piece for my purposes is that sex itself is not the culprit in the derogation 
of the claimants’ dignity.  The sale of sex is, because once the prostitute makes sex 
available in the marketplace, she removes it from its normatively desirable context as 
elaborated by Justices O’Regan and Sachs: love, deep attachment, intimacy, marriage and 
family.133 As both they and the majority conclude, while same-sex sodomy might take 
place as part of what their colleague on the United States Supreme Court would call an 
“enduring personal bond,”134 warranting the overlapping constitutional protections of 
equality, privacy and dignity – prostitution, by its very character, cannot.   Sex itself is 
not portrayed as undignified in Jordan. To the contrary, the dignity of sex and sexual 
actors must be protected against the threats posed by commercialization, lovelessness, 
indiscriminateness, and the divorce of sex from family.  It is the absence of a broader 
 
132 Pars. 27-28 
133 The Court’s holding is consistent with the construction of the African humanist idea of ubuntu, which 
has been translated by the South African court to include the concept of dignity and which has been read to 
encompass respect for “interpersonal relationships at family level.”  Mqeke, supra note __ at 369 (citing S
v. Makwanyane and another 1995 (3) SA 391, (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 1995 (2) SACR 1 (cc), 
pars. 263 and 308) (emphasis added). 
134 It is important to note that just because the leading cases of the United States and South Africa strike 
down sodomy prohibitions relying at least in part on a concept of dignity that involves a strong relational 
component, that does not mean that sodomy cannot be constitutionally protected, even using a dignity 
ideal, in any other way.  In 1957, in a much criticized decision, the German Constitutional Court upheld a 
sodomy prohibition on morality grounds.  (See 6 BVerfGE 389, 432-33 (1957).)  This case is no longer 
considered to be good law.  Subsequent German case law rejects the morality rationale and the sodomy 
prohibition was itself repealed. (See Berle, supra note __ at 137-38, 156 n. 81.  See also the governing 
precedent from the European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (7525/76) [1981] 
ECHR 5 (22 October 1981).  As Berle argues, however, sodomy could be protected on the basis of German 
law’s “emphasis on human dignity and the free unfolding of personality.”  Id. at 138.  Berle’s vision centers 
on the autonomy dimensions of dignity, using the language of “sexual autonomy” and associating the 
concept with individual self-actualization in the Kantian mode.  (Id. at 138.)    
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relationship that impugns sex-for-reward and renders it unworthy of the constitutional 
protection afforded by the South African dignity provision. 
A German case known as “the Peep Show Decision,”135 while operating with 
altogether different expectations for the “dignified” relationship, nonetheless shares this 
general preoccupation.  Citing the constitutional value of human dignity, a Federal 
Administrative Tribunal refused to license a peep show in which a naked woman would 
be seen by individual “spectators sitting in one-person cabins placed around the stage.”136 
According to the tribunal’s own account, the star of the show would have participated 
willingly, but this did not obviate the dignity violation.137 As a result, the case has gained 
attention for running dignity against consent or autonomy.138 What has drawn less notice 
(at least in my reading) is the anti-relational aspect of the peep show.  The tribunal stated 
that  
[t]he mere display of the naked female body does not 
violate human dignity, so that, at least as regards a violation 
of human dignity, no objections exist in principle against 
the usual striptease performances. (…)  Peep shows are 
fundamentally different from striptease performances.  The 
actions of a woman performing a striptease in front of an 
audience she can see are in line with the traditional stage 
and dance show and leave the personal individuality of the 
 
135 SABINE MICHALOWSKI AND LORNA WOODS, GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 104-107 (1999) citing BVerwGE 64, 274 (1981).  This case was reviewed and upheld 
albeit based on different reasoning.  See Klein, supra note __ at 158.   
136 MICHALOWSKI AND WOODS supra note __ at 104. 
137 Id. at 105. 
138 See, e.g., id. at 105-06.  See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 146 (2004) (Nussbaum thinks the tribunal was on to something in its consideration of the 
woman’s dignity, but she would have given more weight to autonomy considerations). 
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performer intact (…).  In a peep show, however, the 
woman is placed in a degrading position, she is treated like 
an object…. for the stimulation of [the spectators’] sexual 
interests.139 
This last line is a strange way to explain the distinction between a striptease and a peep 
show.  Surely women are treated as “object[s]…. for the stimulation of… sexual 
interests” in either case.  It is arguably true, as critics charge, that in this case the tribunal 
has dignity and consent/autonomy running counter to one another.  But why would the 
woman’s consent be overridden by dignity concerns for purposes of licensing one kind of 
performance but not the other?  What seems to bother the tribunal, driving articulation of 
this distinction, is that in the peep show, the gaze travels in only one direction, from 
audience to performer.  Unlike a stripper, the star of a peep show cannot interact with, 
respond to or relate to her audience.  The indignity, one could conclude from the 
tribunal’s analysis, lies there.   
 
IV. Exiling Shame  
But why?  Why is it that the same physical acts are dignified in one context, but 
undignified in another?  Why does the dignity of sexual acts turn on the extent of the 
relationship between the participants?  And in Jordan specifically, why do commerce and 
lovelessness defeat the dignity of sex? 
Recall Whitman’s discussion of the origins of European dignity in the customs 
associated with dueling.  The Nazis’ rhetorical success, which Whitman contends was not 
entirely repudiated in the post-war conception of dignity, was in the promise of 
 
139 Id. at 105. 
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widespread access to high status norms.  Of course, the extension of high status to all 
Germans is more than simply a hollow proposition and a logical impossibility; it reflects 
shame.  A preposterous belief that one has high status is best read as an instance of 
overcompensation, or, in Freudian terms, a reaction-formation140 – that is, an 
unconscious defense against the shame of having low status.    
A couple of the authors in the Kretzmer-Klein volume appear to share this 
intuition.  David Weisstub, in a particularly lucid essay, observes that dignity has its own 
“stylistics.”141 He believes that the term still signifies “[t]he aristocratic attributes of 
being ‘above the crowd,’ being able to control excessive sentiment or emotion, being un-
needy materially (or apparently so), [and] looking like the product of good breeding in 
dress and mannerisms.”142 These stylistics cannot help but precipitate a minor crisis 
when the term is applied to “persons in involuntary states of committal, the mentally and 
medically incapacitated… and the underclasses, [because while] one’s ‘liberal’ instinct is 
to avow the human dignity of all these groups…. this flies in the face of popular use.”143 
As a psychological matter, Weisstub maintains,144 the humiliated person often 
“becomes morally incapacitated, [triggering] instincts such as revenge and desire to 
reconstitute the psyche through acts of distancing.”145 The revenge point is interesting 
enough,146 but I am more concerned with distancing as way of managing shame.  What a 
 
140 Freud 
141 Weisstub, supra note __ at 270. 
142 Id. at 269. 
143 Id.
144 Weisstub “holds the Philippe Pinel Chair of Legal Psychiatry and Biomedical Ethics at the University of 
Montreal Faculty of Medicine.”  THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 296 
(David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) 
145 Weisstub, supra note __ at 279-80.   
146 Weisstub calls on Shakespeare’s Shylock to demonstrate this point, making particular reference to the 
famous speech in which Shylock asks “if you pricke us doe wee not bleede,” noting Shylock’s complaint 
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humiliated person experiences as dignity, Weisstub contends, might instead be 
“identification with the aggressor [or] spurious notions of elitist or aristocratic affect.”147 
Dignity is a reaction-formation against shame or humiliation, therefore, when a 
humiliated person’s response to the condition of humiliation is to distance herself from 
that experience, to don an aristocratic affect, and to adopt the pretentious stylistics of a 
higher social status, the exclusion from which caused the humiliation in the first place.  
This reaction is unconscious and therefore difficult to reach and engage, lending dignity 
the tremendous power of psychic intransigence. 
An analogous reading explains the judicial inclination to protect the dignity of sex 
from threats posed by anonymity, lovelessness and commerce.  A crucial piece of my 
argument is that when a court dignifies some judicially favored brand of sex, it 
simultaneously and inherently degrades sex that occurs outside of the normatively prized 
context.  That conclusion, it seems to me, is logically required and is exemplified by the 
pairing of the two South African cases.  I want to push forward one more step, though, 
and urge that labors on the part of courts to protect the dignity of sex from the threat 
 
that he has been disgraced and that his nation has been scorned, and swearing that “[t]he villanie you teach 
me I will execute.”  Id. at 280. 
147 Id. at 281.  A good illustration of Weisstub’s point comes from Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity 
Cultures: The Case of Kavod and Kvod Ha-Adam In Israeli Society and Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 231 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).  Kamir offers a 
helpful taxonomy of meanings for the Hebrew kavod (which she translates as glory, honor, dignity or 
respect, depending on the context) (see id. at 236-37) and argues that political Zionism began principally as 
an honor discourse. (See id. at 245.)  “Zionism transformed pain, widely felt by European Jews as a result 
of the continuous assault on their dignity and human rights, into anger in the context of national honor.  The 
honor code, eagerly adopted from European and especially from German culture by Zionists and presented 
as authentically Hebrew, made it possible to present Jewish life in Europe as degrading and humiliating to 
the collective entity.  The national state in Palestine was presented as an honorable solution to a 
dishonorable existence in exile.”  (Id.)  An interesting historical note cited by Kamir in support of her 
position is that the writings of Theodor Herzl, the father of political Zionism, apparently “reveal him [to be] 
obsessively concerned with issues of honor…. The first solution Herzl devised for the problem of Europe’s 
Jews was a public duel between a leading anti-Semite and himself, or another Jewish leader.”  (Id. at 247 
(citing Herzl, Herzl’s Writings in Ten Volumes (1960 vol. I, p.5).)  Note in this example the Jewish 
identification with the European aggressor, a point made by Weisstub, as well as the proposal that the Jews 
redeem their honor through a practice associated with the aristocracy. 
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posed by that which takes place outside of the ideal, loving, intimate, familial setting are 
evidence of a reaction-formation.  The reaction is not unlike the reaction against being 
lower-class and the desire to distance oneself from that indignity; it is a reaction 




In his Is the Rectum a Grave?, Leo Bersani argues that the problem with 
phallocentrism is its “denial of the value of powerlessness.” 148 He explains: 
In making this suggestion I’m also thinking of Freud’s 
somewhat reluctant speculation… that sexual pleasure 
occurs whenever a certain threshold of intensity is reached, 
when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed 
by sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ 
those connected with psychic organization.  Reluctant 
because… this definition removes the sexual from the 
intersubjective…. For on the one hand Freud outlines a 
normative sexual development that finds its natural goal in 
the post-Oedipal, genitally centered desire for someone of 
the opposite sex, while on the other hand he suggests not 
only the irrelevance of the object in sexuality but also, and 
even more radically, a shattering of the psychic structures 
 
148 Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM (Douglas 
Crimp ed., 1988). 
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themselves that are the precondition for the very 
establishment of a relation to others.149 
At a certain point on the arc of a sexual encounter, Bersani seems to be suggesting, the 
desired object becomes virtually irrelevant.  At the moment when psychic organization is 
disrupted, sexual orientation and gender identity become moot150 and—as the sexual is 
“remove[d]… from the intersubjective,”—sex is the province of the solo practitioner.   
Bersani is zeroing in on that facet of sex which implicates power.  He continues: 
[T]he self which the sexual shatters provides the basis on 
which sexuality is associated with power….  For it is 
perhaps primarily the degeneration of the sexual into a 
relationship that condemns sexuality to becoming a 
struggle for power. As soon as persons are posited, the war 
begins.151 
Janet Halley elucidates Bersani’s argument this way: 
The self-shattering which Bersani finds in our sexual 
intensities is to be valued as a political project because it 
gestures to a state of being in which the self/other structure 
of social life is suspended and the political will to dominate 
rendered inarticulate and helpless.  The social and the 
political inevitably involve domination or at least the 
struggle for it, but sexuality has a fleeting existence prior to 
and free of them…. [Bersani] argues that the very self 
 
149 Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
150 Halley, Queer Theory by Men (around p. 26?) 
151 Id. at 218 (emphasis in original). 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
Dignity & Degradation 42 11/10/2006 
respect which, in liberal theory, is supposed to check social 
subordinations in the sexual domain--homophobia, 
misogyny and sexual moralism being his examples--
actually produces them and every form of power struggle.  
They cannot be traced to mastery or submission, but to the 
self which would transcend its own relentless problematic.  
Sexual abjection with its momentary disorientation of the 
self offers to interrupt this generation of social dominance 
through the self, and constitutes a vast critique of political 
and social power.152 
Bersani’s purpose is to discern political value in sexual practice – he sees the disruption 
of the self in sex as a disruption of the relationship and the attendant struggle for power 
that occurs intersubjectively resulting in domination and subordination.  My purpose in 
appropriating Bersani’s idea is less ambitious.  I wish mainly to direct attention to that 
facet of sex which occurs outside of relation.   
Consider this account of the sexual arc by psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas, 
noting the importance of both relatedness and anti-relatedness: 
In lovemaking, foreplay begins as an act of relating.  
Lovers attend to mutual erotic interests.  As the economic 
factor increases, this element of lovemaking will recede 
somewhat (though not disappear) as the lovers surrender to 
that ruthlessness inherent in erotic excitement.  This 
ruthlessness has something to do with a joint loss of 
 
152 Halley, Queer Theory by Men 
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consciousness, a thoughtlessness which is incremental to 
erotic intensity. It is a necessary ruthlessness as both lovers 
destroy the relationship in order to plunge into a reciprocal 
orgasmic use.  Indeed the destruction of relationship is 
itself pleasurable [as is] the conversion of relating to 
using...153 
While the Lawrence and Jordan courts extol the virtues of intimacy and struggle 
to defend the dignity of sex that occurs in the context of an enduring relation, they seem 
less inclined to highlight the unrelated facet of sex.  Perhaps anonymous, loveless and 
commercial sex reveal something about even the most loving, marital brand of sex that 
judges do not want to see.  Bersani’s essay begins “[t]here is a big secret about sex: most 
people don’t like it.”154 I take him to be referring to the imminent disaggregation of the 
self, which can be terrifying, as can the aloneness implicit in both the Bersani and Bollas 
accounts.  By emphasizing the relationship, though, this terrifying aspect of sex can be 
discursively exiled.   
The German Peep Show Decision highlights this anxiety around anti-relational 
sexuality, as well.  Some shame, anxiety or terror was triggered by the dropping off of 
relating that occurs in the peep show, prompting the tribunal to distinguish the peep show 
from the striptease on dignity grounds. That the same act of nude dancing was seen as 
sufficiently dignified when the dancer could see her audience but contrary to the 
constitutional value of dignity when she could not, suggests that dignity was acting as a 
textual/doctrinal container for an anxiety about anti-relatedness. 
 
153 CHRISTOPHER BOLLAS, FORCES OF DESTINY: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HUMAN IDIOM 26 (1989).  See also 
ADRIA E. SCHWARTZ, SEXUAL SUBJECTS: LESBIANS, GENDER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 61 (1998). 
154 Bersani supra note __ at 197.  See also Halley supra note __ at __. 
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 In Halley’s explication of Bersani, she writes “the very self respect which, in 
liberal theory, is supposed to check social subordinations… actually produces them.”155 
Once we bring in the idea of reaction-formation, we might add that the liberal ideal of 
dignity, a consummate expression of liberal self-respect, when conceptually tied to a 
morally privileged relationship, not only undermines its own egalitarian ethic, but also 
obscures fear and shame about aloneness in sex—that is, the particular moralism 
expressed in the normative privileging of the enduring relationship reflects (and deflects) 
unconscious feelings about aloneness. 
 
B. Intimacy 
 On the flip side, paradoxically, are shame, anxiety and fear regarding intimacy.  
In Philip Roth’s novel The Human Stain, the protagonist’s lover, ruminates on “[w]hat 
the hookers told her, the whores’ great wisdom: ‘Men don’t pay you to sleep with them.  
They pay you to go home.’”156 Sex, Roth’s hookers seemed to intuit, is not that hard to 
come by.  By itself, it might not sustain the prostitution market.  But the escape that the 
prostitutes offer men from having to perform intimacy afterwards – now that’s worth 
something.   
“[H]uman intimacy,” as Susan Miller writes, “is risky business and often very 
costly.”157 Miller’s work examines the role of disgust in regulating intimacy, and 
guarding against the many risks intimacy poses, including the risk of a total collapse of 
 
155 Id. at ___.  
 156 PHILIP ROTH, THE HUMAN STAIN 236 (2000). 
157 SUSAN B. MILLER, DISGUST: THE GATEKEEPER EMOTION 98 (2004).  Susan Miller is not to be confused 
with a perhaps more well-known Miller who has taken up the same subject matter.  See WILLIAM I. 
MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997). 
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the self into another.158 (Roth’s hookers provide a quite low-cost alternative by 
comparison.)  According to Miller, sex and disgust are partners in a dance,159 playing out 
“our conflicting desires for union and separateness.”160 Disgust, as Miller’s title 
indicates, (“Disgust: The Gatekeeper Emotion”), acts as a gatekeeper, mediating between 
our need for and fear of intimacy.  While the Bersani and Bollas accounts depict an 
aloneness in sex that can be terrifying, Roth and Miller suggest that intimacy can be 
equally frightening.  Judicial prizing of the nicety of the “enduring bond” brand of 
intimacy—a one-dimensional account that raises none of the psychic complexities but 
dignifies morally privileged sex at the expense of the more disreputable varieties—avoids 
confrontation with that difficulty. 
 
C. Animality 
As discussed above,161 one can discern, in the history of human dignity, an 
emphasis on the distinction between human beings and non-human animals.  In the 
Kretzmer-Klein volume, for example, Hubert Cancik explains: 
It is ratio (mind, reason) through which man excels beasts.  
Reason is, according to Stoic anthropology, the distinctive 
quality of man…. The mind…. controls the drives… and 
represses the irrational affects…. It is from this rule of 
 
158 S. Miller, supra note __ at 97-110. 
159 Id. at 110. She is drawing on but slightly modifying Freud, who “understood disgust – along with shame 
and morality – to be a reaction-formation against desire, meaning it is an expression of aversion that 
disguises a desire or an appetite,” Id. at 110-11. 
160 Id. 97. 
161 See infra cite to Cicero at 76. 
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reason over the irrational forces that Cicero derived the 
‘dignity of our nature.’162 
Since animals, according to Stoic assumptions, have only 
sense and sensuality, they are fixed in the present and have 
only a limited foresight and memory.  Man should rule over 
beasts as over his own sensuality, emotions, drives.163 
Human beings, according to this conceptualization, live with the capacity for both 
rationality and irrationality, dignity glorifying the former to the exclusion of the latter, 
which one imagines to encompass our unglamorous bodily desires.  Sex, one could take 
from the Stoic formulation, is a domain in which we are our less rational, more 
animalistic selves. 
Susan Miller also has observed the existence of a certain “anxiety associated with 
sexual behavior [due to] its underscoring of our membership in the animal kingdom,”164 
and Michael Warner has similarly surmised that “[p]erhaps because sex is an occasion for 
losing control, for merging one’s consciousness with the lower orders of animal desire 
and sensation, for raw confrontations of power and demand, it fills people with aversion 
and shame.”165 These commentators are picking up on vestiges of the Stoic view (and of 
 
162 Cancik supra note __ at 25. 
163 Id. at 26.  See also Starck, supra note __ at 183 (citing “an ability, inherent in every human being, which 
enables him to choose freely between sensuality and reason.”). 
164 S. Miller supra note __ at 114.  Miller adds “”the homophobic reaction is not necessarily the response to 
same-sex body contact per se, but may be the response to the animal nature of all sexual passions, seen 
more clearly when looking at something less familiar and slightly alien.” Id. She goes further to suggest 
that “[f]or many men, the humiliation associated with surrendering adult sensibilities and reverting to 
infantile anality may be compounded by the humiliation of assuming the passive, stereotypically feminine 
role of being penetrated [or by] the idea of penetration from behind, which connotes for both genders 
animal sexuality.”  Id.
165 Warner, supra note __ at 2. 
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some analogous religious views166) discernable in contemporary conceptions that observe 
a sharp dichotomy between the rational mind and the beastly drives, only the former 
meriting dignified regard.   
 In her recent book Hiding from Humanity,167 Martha Nussbaum suggests that 
disgust “has to do with our interest in policing the boundary between ourselves and 
nonhuman animals, or our own animality”168 and with a “fantasy of self-transcendence 
[or of] impossible strength or purity.”169 She argues that through the mechanism of 
projection, disgust has the dangerous capacity to produce subordination: 
So powerful is the desire to cordon ourselves off from our 
animality that we often don’t stop at feces, cockroaches, 
and slimy animals.  We need a group of humans to bound 
ourselves against, who will come to exemplify the 
boundary line between the truly human and the basely 
animal….Thus, throughout history, certain disgust 
properties—sliminess, bad smell, stickiness, decay, 
foulness—have repeatedly and monotonously been 
associated with, indeed projected onto, groups by reference 
to whom privileged groups seek to define their superior 
 
166 On the religious side, Orit Kamir reports that “[r]elying on the biblical portrayal of Man as created in the 
image of god, Rabbinical Judaism attributes some of god’s kavod-glory to mankind.” Kamir supra note __ 
at 244. This godly element “precludes suicide, abortion, homosexual intercourse and masturbation among 
other ‘unglorified’ treatments of a person’s body.”  Id. Kamir distinguishes between kavod as glory and 
kavod as dignity, contending that the former refers not to “people’s human essence, but to the godly 
element within them.”  Id. While her taxonomy of the Hebrew term is useful for her purposes, I do not see 
this distinction as crucial here, except perhaps insofar as she asserts that a compromise of kavod as glory is 
regarded as sin, rather than with shame. Id.
167 Nussbaum, supra note __. 
168 Id. at 89 (citations omitted).  Nussbaum treats disgust and shame separately, but I do not see a reason to 
adhere to her separation for purposes of this sub-part or the next. 
169 Id. at 106. 
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human status.  Jews, women, homosexuals, untouchables, 
lower-class people—all these are imagined as tainted by the 
dirt of the body.170 
Nussbaum posits that “[d]isgust at the body and its products has collaborated with the 
maintenance of injurious social hierarchies” and urges the dismantling of social 
formations that result from an unhealthy relationship to human animality. 171 
In the domain of sex, in particular, Nussbaum is troubled by “the time-honored 
view that sex itself has something disgusting about it,”172 and appears to endorse the idea 
that “a healthy society would be one that comes to grips with its own mortal bodily nature 
and does not shrink from it in disgust.”173 At moments such as these in Nussbaum’s 
book, her thinking grows utopian,174—it is not clear to me that the eradication of disgust 
around sex and the human body is an avenue worth pursuing.175 Still valid and important 
to my argument, however, are her observations regarding the fantasy of purity, the 
projection of disgust to create hierarchy,176 and the general anxiety surrounding 
reminders of human membership in the animal kingdom.177 My interest is in the 
 
170 Id. at 107-08. 
171 Id. at 117. 
172 Id. at 137.  Nussbaum is highly suspicious of disgust as a guide to the regulation of sex.  She sees it as a 
“red herring in the law of pornography,” for example, and believes it does not justify sodomy prohibitions.  
Id. at 75. 
173 Id. at 138 (citations omitted). 
174 James Q. Whitman also has criticized Nussbaum’s book on grounds of utopianism, but on a different 
point.  James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2709 (2005) (reviewing 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW (2004)). Whitman 
accepts hierarchy as probably inevitable and would have liked to see Nussbaum engage some of the 
difficult questions regarding the exercise of power under hierarchical conditions.  See id. at 2720-24. 
175 A “healthy society” that has conquered disgust at the human body strikes me as neither possible nor 
unequivocally desirable.  Some sex might be exciting precisely because of the risk of disgust that it just 
barely skirts. 
176 To avoiding subjecting myself to the criticism levied at Nussbaum by Whitman (see infra note __), I 
note that this paper is not an argument against hierarchy in all its forms.  (See infra note __).  It is an 
argument identifying a specific hierarchy and evaluating that hierarchy for its desirability. 
177 See also SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 62 n.7 (James Strachey trans., 1961) 
(“[W]ith the assumption of an erect posture by man and with the depreciation of his sense of smell, it was 
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explanatory contribution of animality in trying to understand the judicial application of 
dignity to a subset of sexual practices.     
One might expect judges to regard sex as belonging to the beastly domain within 
the Stoic formulation and therefore to treat sex as undignified, but the cases discussed in 
this article defy this expectation.  Instead, judges who cannot seem to find any dignity in 
the thought of human beings on the prowl for utterly self-regarding, unrelated, animalistic 
sex can siphon off sex that occurs in the context of an enduring relation from its 
deprivileged counterpart, foisting the shame and anxiety of animalism onto the latter and 
moving the former into the realm of dignity – if only by ignoring its animalistic, irrational 
aspects.   
 
D. Need 
The deep hunger or sense of need associated with sex might also be expected to 
produce feelings of vulnerability and shame.   To the extent that unrelated sex 
foregrounds the base sexual need, shame might prompt a person (such as a judge) to draw 
a sharp distinction between anonymous sex and its more respectable counterparts.  
In her discussion of shame, Nussbaum finds origins in infantile helplessness and 
the wish for omnipotence and comfort178 and links sexual shame to “a more general 
 
not only his anal eroticism which threatened to fall victim to organic repression, but the whole of his 
sexuality; so that since this, the sexual function has been accompanied by a repugnance which cannot 
further be accounted for, and which prevents its complete satisfaction and forces it away from the sexual 
aim into sublimations and libidinal displacements….Thus we should find that the deepest root of the sexual 
repression which advances along with civilization is the organic defence of the new form of life achieved 
with man’s erect gait against his earlier animal existence.”) 
178 Nussbaum, supra note __ at 173. 
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neediness and vulnerability.”179 The danger then comes when one cannot manage one’s 
feelings about neediness internally, but must externalize it by shaming others: 
[P]eople who inflict shame are very often not expressing 
virtuous motives or high ideals, but rather a shrinking from 
their own human weakness and a rage against the very 
limits of human life.  Their anger is not really, or at least 
not only, anger at immorality and vice.  Behind the 
moralism is something much more primitive, something 
that inherently involves the humiliation and 
dehumanization of others…180 
In the area of sex in particular, “insecurity” and “lack of control” leads to hierarchy and 
“scapegoating, in which some vulnerable minority bears the burden of the fears of the 
majority.”181 Nussbaum explains: 
In sexual relations all human beings feel deeply exposed, 
and sex is a particular site of both physical and emotional 
vulnerability, but if normals can brand a certain group as 
sexually deviant, this helps them to avoid the shame that 
they are prone to feel.  In short, by casting shame outwards, 
by branding the faces and the bodies of others, normals 
 
179 Id. at 183. 
180 Id. at 232. 
181 Id. at 296.  Nussbaum’s utopianism shows up in this discussion, as well, particularly where she 
describes a “good development” in which an “infant learns not to be ashamed of neediness.”  Id. at 191.  
She mitigates this somewhat later, however, in an admission of the inevitability of shame.  See id. at 336. 
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achieve a type of surrogate bliss; they satisfy their infantile 
wish for control and invulnerability.182 
Shame over one’s need, therefore, like disgust at one’s own animality, poses the risk of 
projection, and might, for example, find its way into a judicial opinion that is intent on 
distinguishing between privileged sex and a deprivileged variety in which need, 
vulnerability and hunger are more vivid. 
 
So, if sex has an anti-relational dimension – and of course I cannot prove that this 
is always or necessarily so183 – or if intimacy is characterized by high costs and high 
risks, or if in sex we are our most animalistic selves (i.e., irrational and sensual), or if sex 
is a domain of vulnerability and need, and if any or all of these facets of sex provoke fear, 
anxiety or shame, then one could conclude that by conceptually fastening dignity to 
relatedness, courts are effectively proposing that practitioners of anonymous, loveless and 
commercial sex bear the shame and anxiety that attends to sex generally.  Exiling some 
forms of sex from the realm of dignity plainly degrades those forms, but if you are 
persuaded that sex in general comes with some dimensions that provoke shame, fright or 
anxiety, then the degradation produced by the Lawrence and Jordan courts by their 
preoccupied protection of dignified relatedness attaches not only to the exiled varieties of 
 
182 Id. at 219. 
183 This part contains a number of psychoanalytically-oriented assertions, none of which, as far as I know, 
can be proven in the strictest sense.  As Nussbaum concedes, “many people do not have a high regard for 
psychoanalysis.”  Nussbaum, supra note __ at 342.  My best pitch to the skeptically inclined is this:  There 
is no need to buy into psychoanalysis wholesale, no need for example to find purchase in the Oedipal 
triangle, the death drive, or the meaning of dreams.  My argument in this part relies mainly on the existence 
of unconscious motivation and the possibility of projection.  My hope is that when faced with the 
conceptual linkage in the cases between dignity and relationship, as well as the non-inevitability of said 
linkage (e.g., there is the option of linking dignity to absence of harm), few alternative explanations for the 
judicial conception will present themselves and the suggestions offered in this part will come to seem like 
the most plausible, if not only, explanation. 
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sex, but to sex in general.  In the short term, some sex benefits from the constitutional 
shelter befitting such a dignified endeavor, but play out these implications, and sex in 
general is degraded.184 
In short, the dignity of sex reflects the shame of sex.  Like the extension of 
dueling norms to low-status Germans, dignity is the cover story, shame and distancing 
the painful undercurrents.   
Observe for example the similarity between the shame of sexual need and the 
shame of having low social status.  As Weisstub observed, a “stylistic” of aristocracy to 
be mimicked by those with a longing for upper-class respectability is that of “being un-
 
184 Avishai Margalit has argued that the concept of human dignity comes with two hazards: kitsch and 
deification.  (Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity: Between Kitsch and Deification, Dean’s Lecture Series, 
Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University (Feb. 17, 2005) (video available at 
<http://www.radcliffe.edu/events/video.php>).)  He defined “kitsch” – fabulously – as “the absolute denial 
of shit in our life.”  Id. His concern about dignity is that it is easily sentimentalized so that vulnerability 
and innocence (“kitsch”) or Kantian moral autonomy (“deification”) serve as justifications for a universal 
principle of human dignity.  Id. His preference is that human dignity be premised on the notion that human 
beings are “icons of each other.”  Id. Mere universality of humanness, without the need for further 
justification in human traits or conduct, seem to Margolit to contain more promise for tapping into the 
concept when it is most needed.  He cited the treatment of Saddam Hussein, hardly an innocent or noble 
figure, as an example.  Id. Rather than focusing on Saddam’s deservedness, Margolit argued, we should 
treat him with human dignity because he is an icon of all of us.  Id.
This formulation holds significant appeal for me because my concern is the implicit drawing of a 
boundary between innocent, deserving sex (relational, marital, intimate, etc.) and guilty, undeserving sex 
(anonymous, commercial, otherwise depraved).  The sidelining of undeserving sex has consequences for all 
sex, I have argued.  It is not entirely different from Margolit’s idea that indignities committed against 
Saddam Hussein are indignities to an icon of all of us. 
 Margolit’s argument broke down, however, during the question-answer period.  He could not offer 
a reason to draw the line at human beings, for example.  Why is a pet dog not equally a universal icon?  He 
could not offer a justification for his inclination not to intervene where someone has consented to be 
humiliated.  Most importantly, for my purposes, after making frequent use of forced nudity as an example 
of a plain violation of human dignity, he could not say why his obsessive return to the indignity of nudity 
was not a reproduction of the problem of “the absolute denial of shit in our life.” 
 This is not to say that I favor parading prisoners around naked.  Rather, I mean to point out that in 
the answers each of these questions, not only does even Margolit’s refined conception of dignity reveal 
itself to be an abstraction rife with all of the predictable problems of indeterminacy, but also even this critic 
of kitsch and deification feels compelled to extricate dignity from the horror of bare naked animality.  See 
also Nussbaum, supra note __ at 186 (“Why has shame been so often connected to the sexual and to a 
desire to cover our bodily organs from view?”). 
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needy materially.”185 The impulse to distance oneself from one kind of neediness is 
highly reminiscent of the impulse to distance oneself from the other kind.186 
Observe further the similarity between Nussbaum’s idea about projecting shame 
onto some deviant class and Whitman’s account of the power of Nazi rhetoric that 
appealed to the ordinary German’s wish to be included in the aristocracy and the 
concomitant requirement of a low-status outcast on whom one could unload one’s shame.     
Even when the dignity of sexual relatedness blankets some range of practices in a 
manner that seems egalitarian in these contexts, it is performing a hierarchical function 
by foisting the shame somewhere else.  It may be true that the nature of constitutional 
line-drawing requires that some hierarchy be produced, but in this part I have urged that 
the particular hierarchy produced by the exiling of sex that occurs outside of the context 
of a normatively privileged relationship is a bad one,187 both because we might see more 
 
185 Weisstub, supra note __ at 269-71.  
186 Susan Miller identifies a parallel between the disgust associated with sex (remaining mindful of both the 
fear and desire implicated) and the disgust associated with carnivals, where people go to watch “the 
interplay between the desirable and the revolting,” and she points out that this “duality… often associates 
with other dualities, such as upper class and lower class.” S. Miller, supra note __ at 111 (citations 
omitted).  For Miller, the analogy encompasses the tense coexistence of desire and aversion in relation to 
sex and oddities, and this recalls for her the duality of class.  The analogy I mean to draw is close though 
not identical.  It encompasses shame over sexual need and shame over material need.  Both might easily 
produce the wish to distance oneself from the indignity of need by adopting an aristocratic “stylistic” of 
“being un-needy.” 
187 This paper is written in the mode of critique, and I wish it to remain that way, but anticipating that some 
readers at a moment such as this will want to know what hierarchy I would deem more desirable, I will 
digress briefly here to the prescriptive.  My views are best described as “pro-sex,” a position I explained in 
detail in The Future of Sodomy, supra note __ at 199-203.  It is not, at least as I understand it, an “anything 
goes,” libertarian position.  I favor prohibition of some sexual activities, such as rape and child abuse.  A 
pro-sex position does, however, encompass some tendencies that affect how I would construe those terms.  
Among those tendencies are: opposition to an onerous suspicion about sex according to which sex always 
begins by having to justify itself, a general attitude of tolerance and pluralism around sex, refusal to permit 
the difficulties of power in sex to lead to a position that all power differentials in sex are inherently wrong, 
willingness to engage in a cost-benefit analysis around the regulation of sex that takes into account costs 
associated with excess enforcement against sex, and wariness of externalizing the shame of one’s own sex 
by shaming others.  See id (citations to Gayle Rubin, Judith Butler, Duncan Kennedy and Michael Warner 
omitted). These tendencies still leave plenty of room for context-specific analyses that place consent and 
harm concerns at the center.  Consent and harm, of course, are both concepts that have been subject to 
critique, including by me.  See id. at 207-15.  I do not, however, propose them as litmus tests with plain 
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of the kind of concrete legal consequences seen in Jordan,188 and because even that sex 
which, by virtue of its relational context, looks as if it were safe under the blanket of 
dignity, is subject to degradation.  
 
V. Dignity, Rationality and the Ghost of Fascism  
This part discusses yet another role for shame in post-war, universal human 
dignity.  Here, I am not concerned with an unconscious phenomenon, but I do continue to 
be interested in the unique power of dignity to resist critical engagement.  This part 
examines the deployment of shame—at whatever level of consciousness—to insulate 
dignity as a liberal concept from the attacks of critics.  After the Holocaust, the specters 
of fascism and National Socialism haunt those who would express skepticism in the 
direction of liberal rights and reasoning; this might be especially true with regard to 
dignity, the right that undergirds or supercedes all other rights189 and which was so utterly 
eclipsed during the fascist era.   
This defense of dignity grows out of what I labeled earlier “the second 
convention” – i.e., that the appearance of dignity provisions in post-war national and 
international legal texts can be explained as a stark renunciation of Nazism.  The second 
convention is a kernel that has developed into a free-standing case for liberalism, 
 
meanings, but as concepts with heuristic value, to be employed with vigilant attention to the distributive 
implications (i.e., the costs and benefits to a wide range of interests) of their use in each case. 
188 Hopefully, it is clear from the preceding note why I view the concrete legal consequences seen in 
Jordan as evidence of danger. 
189 Dignity’s preeminent place among the rights is asserted over and over in the Kretzmer-Klein volume.  
See, e.g., Dicke, supra note __ at 114 (“dignity is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace” in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).   A primer on German Constitutional Law describes human 
dignity as the foremost principle in German constitutionalism. MICHALOWSKI AND WOODS supra note __ at 
97.  Nussbaum states that “the idea of human dignity, as a political idea, is pivotal to all known forms of 
political liberalism; it may reasonably be included within the core of moral ideas that form the basis for a 
political-liberal conception.”  Nussbaum, supra note __ at 343. 
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according to which there exists a plain continuity between antagonism to liberalism, and 
fascism or Nazism.  Rejection of fundamental principles and rights (such as the right to 
dignity), rejection of Enlightenment rationality (including the possibility of chaste, 
apolitical deduction from first principles), moral relativism and legal positivism, all have 
been linked to fascism by liberalism’s adherents.   
The Kretzmer-Klein volume contains multiple assertions of this continuity.  
Dietrich Ritschl, for example, urges that without a concept of human dignity, “[w]e 
would… end up with an arbitrary situation ethics” and that “for jurisprudence operating 
with a legal system not ultimately grounded in ethics and in anthropological creeds, all 
that would be left is legal positivism.”190 Similarly, after reciting the second convention, 
Klaus Dicke asserts that “faith in human dignity goes along with a call for the 
establishment of democratic states under the rule of law.191 Weisstub, (not stating his 
own position, but rather reporting on what he regards as a “naïve” view), explains that 
after the shock of the Holocaust, “democrats, in order to avoid the punishing 
consequences of radical relativism, turned to human dignity as the over-arching 
protector-value.”192 
190 Dietrich Ritschl, Can Ethical Maxims Be Derived from Theological Concepts of Human Dignity?, in 
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 87, 98 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein 
eds., 2002).  
191 Klaus Dicke, The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 111, 116 (David Kretzmer & Eckart 
Klein eds., 2002). 
192 David N. Weisstub, Honor, Dignity and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values, in THE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 263, 264 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).  
Weisstub adds later that “[t]he pursuit of human dignity as the ultimate governing principle of a legal order 
is based upon the profound disquiet endemic to pragmatic societies who, in their discomfort with 
positivistic science, have turned toward value analysis.  This avenue has been frustrated however by the 
inability of legal philosophers to analyze fundamental values as absolutes, given the modernistic rejection 
of ontological certitude, and the cynicism attendant to it…. The relativism that has lain at the heart of North 
American jurisprudence since the rapid evolution of American Legal Realism since the 1930’s has never 
been resolved…”  
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Of course, the Kretzmer-Klein volume is far from the only place in which this 
conceptual link can be found.   Anthony Sebok, observing Lon Fuller’s “attribut[ion of] 
the rise of fascism to the European embrace of positivism,"193 noted further that  
natural lawyers in American Catholic law schools cited 
[Fuller's] arguments with approval. Francis Lucey, a major 
figure in the neo-scholastic movement at Georgetown, 
completed Fuller's equation by adopting the connection 
between legal positivism and legal realism, and then linked 
legal realism to totalitarianism: 'Realism is being tried out 
today in Germany and Russia... There is not a single tenet 
of Realism that these dictatorships do not cherish, adhere 
to, and try to apply.' 194 
Sebok points as well to F.A. Hayek, who “argued in 1960 that, by dismissing the idea of 
the ‘rule of law’ as a metaphysical superstition, positivists prepared the way for fascism 
and communism.”195 
This particular case for liberalism – that ideas, critiques and impulses antagonistic 
to liberal ideals such as rationality and rights, are continuous with fascism or Nazism – 
exerts a particular kind of power against liberalism’s strong skeptics: the power of shame.  
Who could oppose the fundamental right to human dignity or question the necessity of 
rationality after the Holocaust?  By raising the specter of fascism or National Socialism, 
the liberal marshals the power of shame to thwart criticism of liberal rights and 
 
193 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L.REV. 2054, 2059 (1995). 
194 Id. at 2060 (Full citation omitted, but it is worth including the title of an article cited from a 1945 ABA 
Journal: Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler.)
195 Id. at n. 24 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 236-247 (1960).) 
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR 
Dignity & Degradation 57 11/10/2006 
reasoning.  The case built from the second convention puts liberalism’s skeptics in an 
awkward position.  The threat of shame associated with expressing skepticism toward 
dignity and Enlightenment rationality as overarching ideals exerts tremendous power to 
secure acquiescence.   
It is crucial to note, however, that this strategy, while powerful, carries with it a 
serious hazard.  By producing the mutual necessary entailment of irrationalism and 
fascism or Nazism, the liberal stakes his claim to legitimacy on his own unfailing 
rationality, thereby lending the same immense power to shame to argument strategies – 
such as internal critique196 – that expose the limits of the liberal’s rationality.  When you 
identify the limit of reason and highlight the moment of political choice in an opponent’s 
legal argument, you shame him: you expose as pretense his claim to rightness apart from 
his own desire.  Followed to its logical conclusion, this exposure suggests his fascism, or 
his willingness to rule from sheer power rather than rightness.   
There is, therefore, something mutually shaming in the clash between liberals and 
left deconstructive critics.  The liberal deploys shame to discipline whoever dares assail 
the sacred cows of liberal rights and reasoning by conjuring the ghost of fascism, but this 
shame might easily boomerang back to the liberal when the limits of his own rationality, 
the pretense of his own principled rightness, and the baldness of his own political desires 
are exposed.       
 Interestingly, however, liberalism’s detractors have levied the contrary charge, 
i.e., that Enlightenment rationality itself ought to bear some of the blame for the 
Holocaust.  As Barbara Stark has observed, “[p]ostmodernists such as Theodore 
Adorno… questioned the role of the Enlightenment project itself in the Holocaust.  The 
 
196 Derrida or Duncan’s book 
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‘final solution’ was not, after all, a barbarian rampage, but an orderly, systematic 
‘scientific’ program of genocide – authoritarian, bureaucratic and perversely 
‘rational.’”197 Gillian Rose (lamenting what she seems to regard as an unhelpfully 
dismissive line of postmodern reasoning) describes the “argument… as follows: a tight fit 
is posited between the Holocaust and a general feature of modernity – its legal-
rationality….This leads to the judgement that the feature in question made the Holocaust 
possible or realisable.”198 
Stark and Rose are describing the views of some of liberalism’s postmodern 
skeptics, but even among liberal thinkers it is sometimes rationality and its mechanistic 
variants—including legalism and the market—that are experienced as affronts to human 
dignity.  Observe, for example, the commodification debate over the sale of sex, human 
organs, or babies.199 In contexts such as these we save ourselves from being Nazis – 
from exhibiting contempt for human dignity – not by embracing rationality, but by 
eschewing it, especially in the form of the market, even where the market might be the 
most efficient and rational approach to distribution.  
In a more elaborate example, when former slaves of the Third Reich’s industrial 
sector sued German corporations in American courts in the 1990’s, the proposed 
monetizing of the plaintiffs’ suffering as well as the exercise of ordinary legalism to 
 
197 Barbara Stark, After/word(s): ‘Violations of Human Dignity’ and Postmodern International Law, 27 
YALE J. INT’L L. 315, 324 (2002) (citing Theodore Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(John Cummings trans., 1972)). 
198 GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION 27 (1996).  Rose 
adds: “Sociologists, architectural historians and philosophers conclude that the methods and means of their 
own disciplines are principle actors in the Holocaust.  The devastation of the respective discipline is 
declaimed.”  Id. I believe this to be a bit of a vulgarization of a postmodern trend of which Rose is critical 
in her book, but I include it nonetheless to provide a crisp counter-point to the second convention.  
199 See, e.g., RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) 
(including classic and recent essays on the sale of sex, human body parts, babies, cultural property, care 
work, etc.). See also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
95-103 (1983). 
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address Holocaust-related claims stirred discomfort even among people who might have 
been expected to be sympathetic.200 The rhetorical mainstays that helped to condition the 
outcome of those lawsuits201 were first, that the lawsuits were “not about the money” 
because Holocaust survivors could not possibly be financially compensated for their 
suffering, and second, that the very practice of litigation demeaned the survivors and 
“debase[d] the sacred.”202 The language of “sacred” governed perhaps more than the 
language of “dignity,” though dignity made appearances, as well.203 The terms strike a 
similar chord with regard to both meaning and power in that both are shaming to would-
be assailants, (i.e., who could be so crass as to assert that mere money could compensate 
survivors of the Nazi Holocaust?).204 
In a more doctrinal example, the German Federal Court of Justice (FCJ) and 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) spent a few years duking it out over whether a 
Benetton ad that featured human buttocks bearing the tattoo “H.I.V. POSITIVE,” could 
be prohibited, notwithstanding expressive rights.205 The FCJ twice determined that a ban 
on the ad was justified under Article I of the German Basic Law, which guarantees the 
 
200 See Libby Adler and Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the German 
Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
54-55 (2002). 
201 The suits resulted in a privately administered foundation that offered severely limited payments and no 
“acknowledgment” to the survivors of Nazism.  See generally id.
202 Id. at 54-55. 
203 For example, the leading American diplomat in the negotiations leading to the foundation, Stuart 
Eizenstat, referred to the (low) amount of the settlement as a “dignified sum.”  Id. at 56, n. 338. 
204 In addition, both reflect a reaction-formation against shame on the part of participants in the discourse.  
In the case of the Holocaust, at least some of the underlying shame concerned a Jewish demand for money.  
Id. at 54-57.  Commentators expressed anxieties about reviving “Shylockian stereotypes,” reducing “the 
moral stature of [Holocaust victims’] martyrdom to that of a Monte Carlo casino,” and supplying business 
to an “ambulance chaser.”  Id. at 54-55.  The fact that most claimants under the foundation were not Jewish 
did not ameliorate these concerns.  Id. at 14. 
205 Craig Smith, More Disagreement Over Human Dignity: Federal Constitutional Court’s Most Recent 
Benetton Advertising Decision, 4 GERMAN L.J. __ (2003). 
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right to human dignity, 206 first because it stigmatized persons with the virus, and then (on 
remand with instructions to consider other interpretations of the ad) because even though 
the ad’s meaning could be read to promote “solidarity with suffering human beings, [it 
did so] only cynically; profit was the real motive.”207 
In the end, the FCC overruled the FCJ, holding that a ban on the ad was not 
justified.208 The FCJ erred, according to the FCC, in 
using the ad’s purpose to establish a violation of human 
dignity…. The advertisement employs the misery of AIDS 
sufferers for commercial purposes… [but while an] ad’s 
content can justify prohibition… as violative of human 
dignity…. an ad’s commercial purpose cannot.  The 
[FCJ]… improperly ruled that a profit motive can, by itself, 
rob an ad’s message of the constitutionally mandated 
respect for human beings that the message otherwise 
possesses, thereby transforming a protected expression into 
an infringement of the constitution.       
The FCC is the court of last resort here,209 so the point is made more strongly by the 
dispute than by the ultimate outcome.  Making rational use of – that is, marketing and 
profiting from – a humanitarian and compassionate message (assuming arguendo that 
this is the best reading of the ad) somehow sullies it, raising the question of whether it 
constitutes an affront to Germany’s dignity guarantee.     
 
206 Art. I German Basic Law 
207 Smith, 4 German L.J. at __ 
208 Id. at __ 
209 MICHALOWSKI AND WOODS supra note __ at 37. 
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In these examples, shame afflicts not the limits of rationality and the exposure of 
sheer desire (as would be the case after a successful internal critique of an ostensibly 
neutral deductive process), but the application of rationality in its legal or market forms.  
That is, the privileged corollary, according to the case evolved from the second 
convention, is between rationality and dignity.  Shame, then, would be the unfortunate 
corollary to irrationality.  But this is not how it always works.  On some occasions (such 
as the examples above), resistance to rationality appears as the more dignified course, 
while rationality seems cold, brutal and contrary to human dignity.  Still, it is not clear 
what unifies the examples (selling sex, selling babies, selling human organs, using 
litigation to redress the wrongs done to survivors of the Nazi Holocaust, marketing a 
stigmatizing image of the HIV-positive body, and countless others you can no doubt 
imagine) beyond the fact of their seeming incompatibility with the mechanisms of brute 
rationality.   
It may be that the market stands as a uniquely degraded variant of rationality, but 
the market is sometimes ennobled, for example, when its requisite competitiveness and 
industriousness are juxtaposed against welfare-style paternalism and dependency.210 
Likewise, contrast the degradation of litigation practices in relation to the Holocaust with 
the sometimes dignified ideal of the rule of law.  Rationality and its mechanisms, 
therefore, can be found in either a correlative or an inverse relationship to dignity.       
To sum up, dignified rationality (e.g., the “rule of law”), degraded rationality 
(e.g., Holocaust litigation, baby selling), dignified irrationality (e.g., organ donation, love, 
art for art’s sake), and degraded irrationality (e.g., “legislating from the bench”) together 
 
210 Weber’s Protestant Ethic or  Philo’s sociologist 
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compose a matrix that cannot be made determinate.  We can only place items in the 
boxes by reference to the content of our desire.   
All together, this suggests that the specter of fascism or Nazism is not necessarily 
entailed by rationality or by sheer desire, but by the very specific desires and fantasies 
made real by those perpetrators.211 If Nazism can be made to appear at the bottom of 
both slippery slopes (rationality and irrationality) then maybe it is not really at the end of 
either and the consequences of both the presence and absence of rationality have been 
overstated.  Or, conceived just a bit differently, it may be that the dichotomy between 
rationality and sheer desire is not as sharp as the second convention (or some of its 
postmodern detractors) would have us believe.212 According to that formulation then, it 
would not be merely the consequences of the presence or absence of rationality that have 
been overstated, but the discernibility of the difference.213 
VI. Bringing the Critique Back to Sex 
 
211 Cf. ROSE, supra note __ at 53 (describing “mobilised Fascism” as something which “breaks the barrier 
between the fantasy of revenge and the carrying out of murderous feelings on arbitrarily selected 
scapegoats by joining a movement which has publicly abolished the distinction between fantasy and 
political action.”). 
212 Cf. Daniel Statman, Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 209, 217-221 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) (urging that 
rationality and emotions are not necessarily opposed, that emotions have evolutionary value, and that 
emotions may be rational or irrational).  See also WILLIAM B. IRVINE, ON DESIRE: WHY WE WANT WHAT 
WE WANT (2005) (for an evolutionary account of desire) and ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT 
HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1999) (for the idea that one requires 
emotion to make rational decisions).   
213 I hope not to be read to suggest that rationality is a completely incoherent or useless concept.  In fact, I 
hope the analytic progression of this paper will be regarded as showing evidence of rationality.  I am 
willing to concede, however, that if you trace my argument back you will find evidence of some 
normativity (such as the pro-sex position) that contains a compound mix of rationality and desire, and that 
it is not exactly clear where one ends and the other begins.  Owning the desire facet of one’s argument, it 
seems to me, is worthwhile, if only to preempt charges of bad faith or unexamined premises.  Moreover, as 
discussed in the next note, rationality has deep conceptual ties to self-interestedness, which at the very least 
implicates desire.  
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The dignity that protects sex from the hazards of commerce, lovelessness and 
anonymity teeters on the tail of this fish that flips this way and that.  Anonymous and 
commercial sex could be undignified because they are irrational in the animalistic sense, 
but they could also be undignified because they are rational—in the sense of being driven 
by self-interested calculation.214 While disfavored brands of sex might be degraded 
because they highlight irrationality and animalism, it is rationality that puts the 
“commerce” in “commercial sex.”  We could even understand loveless, anonymous sex 
as depraved precisely because of its utterly rational selfishness.   
Now notice how turned around we are:  I argued above that the irrational 
animalism of sex can instill shame and prompt the exiling of the more disreputable 
varieties.  But the rationality of commercial or anonymous sex also instills shame.  It is 
selfish and loveless, and to the extent that sex and love are supposed to travel together, 
they should also defy and exceed rationality; love is a “deeply anti-nomian” ideal.215 
So, irrational sex can be dignified (i.e., by love) or degraded (i.e., by animalism).  
Likewise, rational sex can be dignified (i.e., by virtue of controlling the beastly drives, or 
confining oneself to a normatively privileged context) or degraded (i.e., by selfishness, 
especially commercialism).   
 
214 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 3-5, 111-145 (1992).  Posner devotes a chapter to “Sex 
and Rationality” in which he proposes that individuals choose to engage in sexual practices after 
calculating the costs (e.g., search costs, moral disapprobation, risk of disease, unwanted procreation) and 
benefits (e.g., hedonistic pleasure, cultivation of social relationships, wanted procreation) of those practices 
to them.  Posner’s rational decision-maker begins with a sexual preference (e.g., for persons of the same or 
different sex), but then engages in acts based on a more elaborate calculus in which preference is one (key) 
factor.  See id. at 114-15.  Nothing in this model, Posner urges, denies love or the emotional or passionate 
dimensions of sex; these feelings can be assigned an economic value in the rational calculus.  See id. at 3-5, 
118.  Observe the interconnectedness of self-interest and rationality, an idea to which we are quite 
accustomed in the field of economics generally, though Posner’s bringing it to bear on sex might rub some 
people the wrong way.  
215 See WARNER, supra note __ at 100 (critiquing a love-based argument for same-sex marriage).   
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The connections and breaks between dignity and rationality, dignity and sex, and 
rationality and sex are indeterminate, volatile and chaotic—and this can be immobilizing.  
The point of this kind of critique is to muscle through the chaos and demonstrate that the 
distinction drawn between sex dignified by virtue of its normatively privileged context 
and sex degraded by its disfavored context is a product of something other than analytic 
necessity—something, I have suggested, that is rooted in sexual shame and anxiety. 
The critique is also designed to open a place for intervening in the discourse of 
dignity.  The unconscious shame that underlies dignity and the specter of fascism that 
dignity allegedly repudiates render the concept formidable and bewildering.  One place to 
intervene is here, in the propensity to prettify sex by distancing it from its shames, terrors 
and anxieties.  Even when it seems like an egalitarian idea, such as when it extends 
constitutional protection to sexual practices associated with gay people,216 it shares a 
hidden structure that other incarnations of egalitarian dignity have illustrated: it relies on 
a hierarchy, the very notion of aristocratic dignity that we supposedly left behind at the 
time of the Enlightenment.  In the short run, aristocratic dignity has the understandable 
appeal of the victories in Lawrence and the South African Sodomy case, but Jordan or
216 See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23 (1993) (for explication of a “rhetorical system” of act and identity related to 
sodomy that places gay men and lesbians in a dangerous “double bind” and cuts in favor of political 
alliances oriented around sexual practices rather than around politically malleable identity categories).   
See also EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry 
James’s The Art of the Novel 35, 62-64, in TOUCHING FEELING: AFFECT, PEDAGOGY, PERFORMATIVITY 
(2003) for the suggestion that “therapeutic and political strategies aimed directly at getting rid of individual 
or group shame, or undoing it, have something preposterous about them… for instance... gay pride…”  
Relying heavily on the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins, Sedgwick urges that “[t]he forms taken by 
shame are not distinct ‘toxic’ parts of a group or individual identity that can be excised; they are instead 
integral to and residual in the processes by which identity itself is formed.”  From this, Sedwick extracts 
political value, especially the possibility of conceiving identity without essence.  Sedgwick’s idea provides 
a nice counter-point to Nussbaum here, in that while the latter shares (with me and probably also with 
Sedgwick) a certain wariness about projecting one’s shame outward, she sometimes seems to harbor a 
utopian wish to eradicate shame through some other, less politically odious, means.   Sedgwick calls into 
question both the feasibility and the desirability of this wish. 
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the Peep Show Decision or another case regarding sex that has not yet benefited from 
relative respectability—as sodomy did not until recently—might be just around the 
corner.   
In addition, the materials on which I focused are meant as evidence of a shaming, 
anti-sex discourse.  I use discourse in the Foucauldian sense of the term – that is, as an 
exertion of power that can produce and reproduce truth in a way that can be quite difficult 
to see.217 Foucault maintained that “there can exist different and even contradictory 
discourses within the same strategy.”218 Discourses of both the rationality and the 
irrationality of sex, or its dignity and its shamefulness, can coexist to produce a truth 
about sex, such that its dignity consists in the denial of its terrifying or anxiety-provoking 
facets.  “We must not expect the discourses on sex to tell us… what strategy they derive 
from, or what moral divisions they accompany, or what ideology… they represent,”219 
Foucault advised.  The constitutional courts did not explicitly embrace any anti-sex 
ideology—they represented themselves as protecting sex’s dignity.  They apparently had 
the idea that they were employing dignity in its modern, universal, egalitarian valence.   
To see beyond this, Foucault proposed that “we… question… [the discourses’] 
tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects of power and knowledge they ensure).”220 
This paper has been such an effort.  Dignity—its historical double-meaning, its volatile 
relationship to rationality, and its connection to normatively privileged relationships in 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding sex—is born of and reproduces shame.221 
217 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. I. at 100 (“it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together.”) 
218 Id. at 102. 
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 A number of queer theorists have written richly of shame, not merely as an unfortunate affective 
experience, but as identity constituting and politically valuable.  See Sedgwick, supra note __ and also 
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In short, if you are inclined, as I am, to believe that a discourse of dignified sex 
that denies the terror of aloneness, the costs of intimacy, or the anxieties people feel 
about their animalism and need, left uncritiqued, poses hazards to sex that are not always 
easy to guess, then the conclusion must be to critique.  Dignity functions as a warning 
sign, steering us away from what is painful in our own experience as well as from 
critically engaging with liberal rights and reasoning.  Don’t heed it.   
It remains only to propose a parallel between the shaming of sex and the shaming 
of politics.  I have suggested that the judicial exiling of sex that takes place outside of an 
“enduring bond”—sexual excess, if you will—in favor of a dignified ideal of intimate 
relatedness, reflects and also produces shame regarding various aspects of sexual 
experience.  Those aspects might be most vivid in the context of anonymous or 
commercial sex, but, I have proposed, a little more consideration turns them up in 
enduring relationships, as well.  But aristocratic dignity and the ennobling of rationality 
have a much more capacious domain.  Perhaps especially in the judicial realm, they exile 
and shame the sheer political desire222 that – as critically inclined writers have exposed 
on many, many occasions – often can be found lurking in seemingly chaste judicial 
reasoning.  I do not claim here that the shaming of sex causes the shaming of politics or 
even that one entails the other, merely that each is easier to see in the other’s light.  My 
hope is that there is some transferability to my analysis. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
Bersani, supra note __ at 215-218 on the political value of shame/abjection.  The shame to which I refer 
here, however, is what Michael Warner referred to as “more shame”—a secondary sort of shame that 
comes in response to the shame/abjection of sex (Warner, supra note __ at 3).  This secondary sort, as both 
Warner and Nussbaum recognize, poses a high risk of projection.  See also Adler, supra note __ at 203. 
222 Thanks to Janet Halley for an important piece of this thought. 
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This critique suggests the advisability of wariness about advocating in terms that 
overcompensate for shame by promoting an ideal of dignity.  Uncritical participation in a 
dignity discourse around sex carries hidden costs.  If what we want is increased 
constitutional protection for sex—notwithstanding its shames, terrors and anxieties—then 
we should think carefully about the benefits and hazards of the advocacy terms we 
choose, rather than plunging headlong into the discursive banishment of our most 
terrifying selves.   
